OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista

CHINA’S FOUR SECRETS

Chinese Ambassador Zhao Jianhua recently disclosed that China has four secrets which have made it possible for China to rise and become a global economic power: (1) good leaders; (2) good policies consistently followed over a long-term period; (3) a hard working population; and (4) a peaceful and secure environment.

The tensions in the South China Sea poses a danger to the peaceful and secure environment that China needs to continue with its dynamic economic growth.  In particular, China needs peaceful relations with the United States and its ASEAN neighbors to promote its ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.

This initiative consists of the land-based Silk Road Economic Belt to join China with Central Asia first proposed by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in September 2013, and the 21^st Maritime Silk Road to connect China with the ASEAN member countries, the South Asian countries, and with Africa and Europe, which he proposed a month later in Indonesia.

Eventually, the two new silk roads are envisioned as a grand initiative to link China not only with the continents of Eurasia and Africa but also the Americas up to Brazil, through trade, investments, transport and energy infrastructure projects, tourism, education, culture and other areas of cooperation.  This grand initiative is also planned as a mega development project for the countries along the network.

This global enterprise is an incentive for China to improve relations with its ASEAN maritime neighbors and maintain peace and security.  China cannot ignore the strategic location in the South China Sea of the Philippines which is also situated at the heart of the Archipelagic continent extending from Japan to Indonesia and Papua New Guinea with the Philippines at the center.  The envisioned new maritime silk road to link China with Indonesia and Brazil will pass through the Philippines.  Indeed, this is really the revival of the galleon trade that made Manila the first global city, linking the different continents of the world.

The perceived major threat to peace in Asia, disturbing the peace and security that China needs to solidify its economic gains, is its rivalry with the United States.  This is discussed in an article entitled: “The Thucydides Trap Discourse in China-US Relations”  by Cai Cuthong contained in the same July-August 2016 issue of the China International Studies

The article, published by the China Institute of International Studies, one of the leading think tanks in China, explains that the “Thucydides Trap” or the rivalry between a rising power (Athens) and the dominant hegemon (Sparta) made the Peloponnesian war inevitable between these two city states.  Thucydides had noted that such a competition mostly ends up with war.

The article reports that Graham Allison, a Harvard professor, had proposed in his testimony to the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services that “The Thucydides Trap has been sprung in the Pacific.”   Allison’s studies showed that in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years, when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war.  The article further notes that  the “Thucydides Trap” has suddenly become a popular concept in international relations in the West.  China’s rise is perceived, according to the article, as challenging the US predominance in Asia today and in the world in the future and thus constitutes today’s  “Thucydides Trap”.

The article, however, expresses the opinion that the concept of the  “Thucydides Trap” is not applicable to China-US relations.  It is striking that the article gives the rule of law as an important reason why the situation in the world today is different from that of ancient Greece, observing

that “there were no international organizations and international law as a kind of mechanism to achieve international peace.”  Indeed, these play an important role in constraining interstate conflict as the article points out.

It is interesting that the article states that, “even though some people may question the actual constraint force of international law and international organizations on major countries, the US in particular, the collective security mechanism at least has reinforced the moral constraint and increased the violation costs of international profile and public opinion.”  Thus, the article shares the view that the rule of law also protects the interests of major powers.

The article further reports on the progressive development of international law, stating

that “the compulsory system of international law has got more rigid with the emergence of the entities of many international organizations.  And more and more terms embodying the idea of “direct application” arise in the rules of international organizations.  Relevant legislation and arbitration begin to be characterized by enforcement and rigidity.”

Finally, the article also observes that “Although the rigidity of international law is not comparable with that of domestic law, the international community is still able to exert influence in indirect ways so as to realize the goal of its compulsion.”   This is a perceptive insight on the value of decisions and awards of international courts and arbitration tribunals, as opposed to the dismissive attitude giving little importance to their value on the ground that they are unenforceable.

It is important that China’s fourth secret for its successful emergence as a global economic power, namely the necessity of a peaceful and secure environment, be kept in mind and supported because China’s economy is one of the engines moving the global economy.   Thus, the Philippine Council on Foreign Relations delegation, composed of retired ambassadors and armed forces and police generals, and members of the Academe and business, paid a visit to Beijing last 13-16 September 2016, upon the invitation of the Chinese Ambassador. 

Engagement with China, including through track 2 diplomacy, combined with vigilant monitoring of Chinese activities in the South China Sea, will serve to enhance our national interests, promote friendship, and maintain peace and security.

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista

Choices in the South China Sea

The Arbitration Tribunal of the Law of the Sea resolved bilateral issues between the Philippines and China, specially confirming that the Philippines has sovereign rights over a 200 mile EEZ and Continental Shelf in the South China Sea/West Philippine Sea pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The Tribunal enjoyed jurisdiction over the case because the Philippines was careful not to raise questions of sovereignty over territory.

Now our country needs quiet negotiations in invoking the Rule of Law, based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to which China is also a Contracting Party.  The decision of the Arbitration Tribunal is final and binding but the enforcement of the ruling is based on the good faith of China to comply with its obligation under UNCLOS to respect the ruling. 

Bilateral Talks.  President Fidel V. Ramos has described his visit to Hong Kong as a dialogue with friends to seek ways to establish peace, harmony and goodwill, and not a part of the bilateral talks with the Chinese Government.  The formal talks are needed with the Chinese government for China to refrain from continuing with activities that contravene our rights, such as preventing our vessels from fishing in our EEZ and our fishermen from pursuing their livelihoods by traditional fishing at Scarborough Shoal, as well as from interfering with our survey and exploitation of the resources of the Reed Bank. 

The more sensitive discussion will be to arrive at a way for China to end its occupation of Mischief Reef, which is a low tide elevation forming part of our Continental Shelf, and which China has converted into an artificial island.  Asking China to end its occupation of Scarborough Shoal, which is not part of the Spratly Islands, will need more goodwill on both sides but this issue was not covered by the Arbitration ruling 

Multilateral Talks Needed over Spratlys.  The bilateral talks between the Philippines and China may begin with matters outside the Arbitration ruling which will allow the talks to proceed with pragmatism and goodwill, as suggested above by PFVR, including a reminder of our geographical and historical ties, our cultural and commercial relations, our ties of kinship. 

The scope of the bilateral talks may widen and include preliminary discussion of solutions to the territorial problem of the Spratlys, such as the idea of a maritime park which will benefit all the coastal states.  These bilateral talks, however, will not be able to resolve the dispute over the Spratlys because more than two countries claim sovereignty over them.  Thus, the issue of sovereignty over the Spratlys requires multilateral talks. 

ASEAN and China have recognized that this dispute affects the peace and stability of the region and should be resolved peacefully.  To this end, ASEAN member countries and China signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in Phnom Penh on 4 November 2002.  This Declaration includes the statement in its final Paragraph 10 that “The Parties concerned reaffirm that the adoption of a code of conduct in the South China Sea would further promote peace and stability in the region and agree to work, on the basis of consensus, towards the eventual attainment of this objective.”  Unfortunately, the Code of Conduct still has to be negotiated and adopted in multilateral talks between ASEAN and China..

ASEAN Reaction to Arbitration Ruling.  The ASEAN Foreign Ministers at their recent annual meeting held in Vientiane last July issued a Joint Communique which took note of the UNCLOS arbitration ruling and the tense situation in the South China Sea in the aftermath of the decision:    “We remain seriously concerned over recent and ongoing developments and took note of the concerns expressed by some ministers on the land reclamations and escalation of activities in the area, which have eroded trust and confidence, increased tensions and may undermine peace, security and stability in the region.” The Foreign Ministers further declared:  “We emphasized the importance of non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of all activities, including land reclamation that could further complicate the situation and escalate tensions in the South China Sea.”

The ASEAN Foreign Ministers reaffirmed their “commitment … to the peaceful resolution of disputes, including full respect for legal and diplomatic processes, without resorting to the threat or use of force, in accordance with the universally recognized principles of international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. “  The reference to legal and diplomatic processes, principles of international law and the UNCLOS is a code to refer to the arbitration tribunal’s decision.

China – United States Rivalry.  While the filing of the Arbitration Case against China had increased tension between the Philippines and China, the major anxiety for many analysts is having an accidental skirmish between the Chinese and United States navies and air forces in the South China Sea and the escalation of the conflict that may follow. 

The United States has opposed China’s claim of sovereignty over the area covered by China’s announced nine-dash- line, and is concerned about the possible militarization of certain reefs in the high seas, which China denies.  China’s recent activities in the South China Sea is understood as a reaction to the United States’ policy of “pivot to Asia” which China perceives as a policy directed to contain China.  The United States has made the challenge to China’s claim of sovereignty over a part of the high seas by sending vessels and aircraft through the area in the exercise of freedom of navigation and overflight in the high seas.

While the Philippines is bound by the provisions of the UNCLOS, the Philippines does not take sides on the perceived geopolitical conflict between the United States as the dominant superpower in the world and China, as the rising star in the Pacific region.   Similarly, the United States has repeatedly announced that it does not take sides on the issue of sovereignty over the Spratlys.  The Philippines has a policy of maintaining friendly relations with all countries in accordance with the declaration in the Philippine Constitution that the Philippines “adheres to a policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations.”

Philippine Independent Foreign Policy.  The Philippine Constitution also provides that “The Philippines shall pursue an independent foreign policy.  In its relations with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty, territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.” 

We have observers who think that Philippine foreign policy is tilted in favor of the United States.  The Philippines’ defense alliance with the United States, and its recent agreements relating to Visiting Forces and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) are perceived as showing this.

Recently, the Supreme Court ruled with finality on the constitutionality of EDCA, which the Supreme Court interpreted as an executive agreement implementing the  Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) and the Visiting Forces Agreement.  The Supreme Court noted that it is the Executive Department that is given the responsibility to decide on the wisdom of entering into the agreement.

The Philippine Government has maintained that the Philippines needs the MDT and its implementing agreements because, among other reasons, they provide a shield for our armed forces in the Kalayaan Islands and our marine contingent guarding our Second Thomas Shoal.  Under the MDT, the United States should come to the aid of the Philippines in case Philippine armed forces are attacked.  The Philippines notes that the MDT is only a defense agreement and is not aimed at any country at peace with the Philippines.  The Arbitration ruling defining the extent of the Philippines’ EEZ and Continental Shelf in the South China Sea and the Supreme Court ruling on the constitutionality of EDCA begs the question of whether the United States under the MDT is committed to the defense of our EEZ and Continental Shelf, as the extension of our metropolitan area.

Multipolar World and ZOPFAN.  China may be at the crossroads of deciding whether to test the policy of “might is right” or be more accommodating and law abiding.  In 1979, China engaged Vietnam in a war to teach Vietnam a lesson.  The lessons of the Second World have shown that economic might is more relevant and influential than military power. 

Germany is now seen as the leader of the European Union while Japan subsequently attained its war objectives by peaceful means. 

A policy of militarization of the Spratlys may prove to be unwise for China because this raises the level of insecurity among her neighbors.  Indeed, many ASEAN countries have increased their military expenditures and strengthened their navies and air forces. They have seen the value of having the presence of a Superpower which does not pose as much as a threat because the United States is outside the region.  The ASEAN countries may be pushed firmly into the arms of the Superpower and the continuation of the Unipolar World.

China may decide to look at other security options.   Instead of acting like a colonial power against the advice of Deng Xiaoping, China could decide to be the Good Neighbor and observe the Rule of Law, which protects all nations big or small.  In line with its objective of reverting to a Multipolar World, China could follow a strategy of supporting the emergence of a strong and influential ASEAN, which is neutral and non-aligned with any Great Power.  ASEAN, after all, has shown that it has the potential of becoming a regional power and one of the poles in a Multipolar world.

China previously declared that it would respect and support the ASEAN vision of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN).  The revival of the vision of ZOPFAN during bilateral or multilateral talks could be a long-term solution for achieving lasting peace and prosperity.  A precondition for ZOPFAN would be resolving the territorial disputes in the Zone. There would be need of confidence building measures to restore trust and confidence on all sides.  The establishment of ZOPFAN would need the cooperation of the United States.  ZOPFAN would remove the region from Great Power conflicts and could make China feel safer from intrusion by outside Powers. 

A scenario like this is worth striving for.  We should work with friends to bring countries together to achieve lasting peace and greater prosperity in our region based on the Rule of Law.

Note:  Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista is a retired career diplomat whose last diplomatic assignment was Ambassador to Russia, and concurrently to Belarus, Ukraine, the three countries in the Caucasus and the five Central Asian states.  He was assigned to the Philippine Embassy in Beijing from 1976-9 and acted as Charge d’ Affaires a. i. at various times.  He is professor of law at Ateneo de Manila Law School and Philippine Christian University.

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista, Doctor of Laws

PH COMPLIED WITH UNCLOS TO WIN ARBITRATION

Now the country needs quiet negotiations in invoking the rule of law.

The Philippines won in almost all its submissions against China in the South China Sea award by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNLOS) Arbitration Tribunal, including the main issues that compelled the Philippines to urgently file the arbitration complaint, namely: that China had prohibited Philippine fishermen from exercising their historic rights to fish in Scarborough Shoal, and that China had unlawfully interfered with Philippine petroleum exploration in the Reed Bank which is within the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Philippines.  The Tribunal ruled that the decision is final and binding.

The ruling, however, declined the Philippines’ submission that, following the decision, the Tribunal should issue a Declaration that China shall respect the rights and freedoms of the Philippines and comply with its duties under the Convention. The Tribunal “noted that both the Philippines and China have repeatedly accepted that the Convention and general obligations of good faith define and regulate their conduct.” 

The Tribunal considered that “the root of the disputes at issue in this arbitration lies in fundamentally different understandings of their respective rights under the Convention in the waters of the South China Sea.”  The Tribunal recalled that it is a fundamental principle of international law that bad faith is not presumed and noted that Article 11 of Annex VII provides that the “award . . . shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute.”

Even inside the Philippines, there was difference of opinion on the issue of historic rights and the effect of the UNCLOS provision on these rights.  A group of Philippine lawyers opposed the enactment of Republic Act 9522 defining the Archipelagic baselines of the Philippines. This law was passed, on the recommendation of the Department of Foreign Affairs, to ensure that Philippine law conforms with UNCLOS, which the Philippines is bound to observe under the principle of pacta sunt servanda as a Party to this Convention. This was necessary to enable the Philippines to come to the UNCLOS tribunals with clean hands in case of need to protect its rights under the Convention.

The Petition before the Philippine Supreme Court to declare R.A. 9522 unconstitutional was based on the Philippines’ historic rights over waters passed by Spain to the United States. The Petition alleged that the archipelagic baselines defined in the law reduced Philippine maritime territory in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.  The Petition argued that R.A. 9522 “dismembers a large portion of the Philippine territory because it discards pre-UNCLOS definition of national territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

The Petition was based on the Treaty Limits doctrine, which declares that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty of Paris of 1898 were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the rectangular area drawn under the treaty. According to this theory, the territorial waters of the Philippines extends hundreds of miles around the Philippine archipelago embracing the said rectangular area.  However, under UNCLOS, the territorial sea cannot extend beyond 12 miles from the baselines.

The Supreme Court understood that UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory, which is governed by general international law on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription. The baselines are only statutory mechanisms for Parties to UNCLOS to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. 

The Petitioners further objected to the declaration in R.A. 9522 that the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) shall be determined as “Regime of Islands” because “this weakens our territorial claim” to KIG and results in a great loss of maritime area.   However, R.A. 9522 issued this declaration to make our claim consistent with article 121 of UNCLOS.  Article 121 enunciates the principle that the nature of the land, whether they are islands or rocks, determines its maritime entitlements.

The Supreme Court observed that the KIG was not included in the pre-UNCLOS baselines of the previous law and that the inclusion of the KIG within the Philippines archipelagic baselines would have resulted in the breach of two provisions of UNCLOS. Consequently, the treatment of KIG within the “regime of islands” was a responsible observance of the Philippine pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS.  Moreover, as noted above, under the UNCLOS “regime of islands”, land features generate their own maritime zones.

It may be noted that the Philippine Government, with all the three branches taking part, prepared well to use the Rule of Law as a shield to protect the Philippines’ maritime zones.  This is the first defense of countries against bigger Powers. The second plank in the defense of our national territory and maritime zones would be the use of diplomacy and political alliances, and the third should be credible armed forces as a deterrent to unlawful use of force.  

The legal strategy of the Philippines in the arbitration case was to question the basis of the 9-dash-line because it cuts across and attempts to deprive the Philippines of two thirds of its EEZ.  The Philippines also needed to demonstrate that China has no maritime zones overlapping our EEZ or continental shelf.  Once both of these were established, China would have no legal basis to remain in, or to threaten to occupy, any of the submerged features in our EEZ/Continental Shelf such as Mischief Reef, Reed Bank or the Second Thomas Shoal because they would clearly form part of our Continental Shelf.

It may be noted that the Treaty Limits doctrine is based on the theory of historic rights over waters in the high seas. The Arbitration Tribunal concluded that prior to UNCLOS, the waters of the South China Sea were legally part of the high seas.  The Tribunal further concluded that the 9-dash-line was a claim of historic rights to resources within the high seas, and that if such rights existed, it was extinguished by the Convention to the extent that they were incompatible with the Convention’s system of maritime zones because the Convention comprehensively allocates rights to maritime areas. China could not, therefore, claim historic rights to resources within the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone.

The provision in RA 9522 designating the KIG as within the “regime of islands” allowed the Philippines to maintain that all of the land features within the so-called group of Spratly Islands are rocks without any EEZ.  As the land features in the so-called group of Spratly Islands would have only a territorial sea of 12 miles, their maritime zones would not overlap with the Philippines’ 200 mile EEZ/Continental Shelf in the West Philippine Sea/South China Sea.

The non-designation of baselines for the KIG likewise allowed the Philippines’ position to be in conformity with the Tribunal’s ruling that the Convention does not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.

With the absence of overlapping maritime zones between the Philippines and China, the Tribunal ruled that Mischief Reef, Second Thomas Shoal and the Reed Bank, being submerged at high tide, are neither islands or rocks, and form part of the EEZ and Continental Shelf of the Philippines. However, the Tribunal disagreed with the Philippines’ position that McKennan Reef, located within the Philippines EEZ, and Gaven Reef (North), located on the high seas, are submerged features, and ruled that both are high tide features and are, therefore, rocks with their own 12 mile territorial sea. 

The Philippines did not raise the issue of sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal, which is well within the Philippines EEZ, as this is outside the UNCLOS Arbitration Tribunal’s jurisdiction, which is limited to the interpretation or application of the UNCLOS Convention on maritime zones. Likewise, the Arbitration Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to decide which country has territorial sovereignty over McKennan Reef and Johnson Reef, both of which are also within the Philippines’ EEZ.  These three rocks are enclaves within the Philippines EEZ with a territorial sea of their own of 12 miles. Unfortunately, the Philippines cannot bring the issue of sovereignty over these rocks to the International Court of Justice or some other tribunal without China’s consent.

This is unfortunate because the UN Charter, under its Art 2 (3) requires Member States to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are not endangered, and its Art 2 (4) further provides that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

On the other hand, as can be appreciated, the compulsory settlement of disputes by arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding the interpretation and application of its provisions is an example of the progressive development of international law to rule out force in the settlement of international disputes.  The States Parties to UNCLOS gave their prior consent to the compulsory settlement mechanism in UNCLOS by ratifying or acceding to the Convention.  This innovation under UNCLOS makes it possible that such disputes are settled within a reasonable time in a peaceful manner.

Since the arbitration ruling in favor of the Philippines is a final and binding award, the Philippines has the Rule of Law firmly in its favor.  China has the difficult task of opposing and maintaining its opposition to the Rule of Law.  Although the Arbitration Case was between the Philippines and China, the arbitration ruling benefits the rest of the world.  Vietnam has expressly recognized the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal while the Tribunal’s decision that the nine-dash-line has no legal basis also serves to defend the maritime claims of Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia.  Since the Arbitral Tribunal has declared that the South China Sea, minus the maritime zones of the coastal states, is legally high seas, all the countries of the world enjoy the freedom of the high seas in the South China Sea, including the freedom of fishing.  The corresponding deep seabed under the high seas and its resources also pertain to all countries under the concept of common heritage of mankind.  

The Arbitration Tribunal noted that both China and the Philippines have repeatedly accepted that the Convention and general obligations of good faith define and regulate their conduct.  China needs a little time to resolve its internal debate on the arbitration ruling.  Skillful diplomacy and good faith on both sides may enable China to see the light at the end of the tunnel and comply with the provisions of the UNCLOS Convention.

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista, Doctor of Laws

MEETING RUSSIANS

On June 12, both the Philippines and Russia will celebrate their national day.

My first exposure to Russians was in Peking when then Minister Rodolfo Severino, Jr. invited me to accompany him to get to know some Russian diplomats at cocktails in the latter’s apartment.  This was in 1976 during the height of the “Cold War” when China was at odds with the Soviet Union, which allowed a thaw in relations between the United States and China.  I experienced a strange feeling pleasantly exchanging points of view with them, Russians then being regarded by our then American-indoctrinated society as the adversary. The world has since changed and, now, it is not unusual for Filipinos to meet Russians and interact with them.

In Russia, it was an experience meeting Presidents Boris Nicolayevich Yeltsin and later Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin.  On each of the official functions at the Kremlin, I wore a barong tagalog to show the flag, even during winter time.  Yeltsin struck me as a very charming and nice person. The conventional wisdom about him in diplomatic and political circles was that his elixir was power, but he showed that he was above all a patriot by resigning and handing power to Putin on the eve of the 21st Century.  Putin gives Russia a sense of confidence and optimism.

Other political leaders I met were the former Soviet leader, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, and the charismatic General Alexander Ivanovich Lebed who negotiated peace with the Chechens.  I had the experience of engaging with oligarchs like Boris Berezovsky, whom I hosted twice for lunch at our Embassy, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Yukos, whom I met at a small round table dinner for eight hosted by the Doyen, the Swedish Ambassador.  Although Khadarovsky had an interpreter, he spoke in English with us on his political plans and answered questions.  Both oligarchs sought to obtain political power and lost, and were subsequently banished into exile.

On the other hand, Andrei Fursenko, whom I interviewed and inducted to office as our Honorary Consul General in St. Petersburg, became Russian Minister of Industry, Science and Technologies in 2003, after first serving as Vice Minister, and then served as Minister of Education and Science until 2012.  Putin was Vice Mayor of St. Petersburg whose duties included overseeing a scientific organization headed by Fursenko, which was tasked with developing scientific projects for industrial purposes. 

Our diplomatic experience in Russia was more than the usual political, economic and cultural work.  Moscow is host to one of the largest diplomatic corps and remains the top diplomatic post of the United States.  I had the satisfaction of meeting some of the most seasoned diplomats like Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov, an expert on the Middle East who became Prime Minister, as well as U.S. Ambassador Thomas Pickering.  I was privileged to become the Doyen of the Asian Group.

My work extended to meeting Russian lawyers at business forums sponsored by the Associates of American law firms, and distinguished professors of the Russian Academy of Science, which inducted me as a member.  I gave talks to Russian students and enjoyed the tradition of Russian universities celebrating the first day of school as a festival to welcome their new students.  The senior students take symbolic control of the school and each of the welcoming classes compete in song or dance presentations.

Moscow is one of the great centers of culture in the world with its great theatres, concert halls, and museums.  We had the pleasure of regularly attending ballet performances at the Bolshoi theatre at diplomatic prices.  During Christmas time, we noted that Russian children (boys and girls) are treated to watching the ballet Nutcracker Suite at other theatres, and we observed how well behaved they are.  Cinema was the favored art form during Soviet times.  Russia has an advanced movie industry and hosts the Moscow Film Festival. We were present when the Philippines’ entry was the movie Saranggola.

Sports is an important facet of Russian life because it develops character and discipline. Not long ago, the Soviet Union competed with the United States for the most Gold medals in the Olympic Games.  We were lucky to be invited to soccer games of the European Champions League in Moscow, where we witnessed the admirable support of the Russian fans for their team. When their team is losing, they cheer louder and even louder when their team falls farther behind.  At the end of the game, the Russian fans remain seated and leave by row when their turn to leave is signaled.

The official visit to Russia in 1997 of President Fidel V. Ramos was a high point in our relations with Russia. My spouse, Conchita, met Mrs. Naina Losifovna Yeltsina who was the gracious hostess of First Lady Amelita Ramos.  In accordance with protocol, Conchita accompanied Mrs. Ramos in all of her cultural and social activities in the same way that President Ramos required me to be present in all of his official schedule. 

Conchita also met Mrs Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Putina who consented to be the Honorary Chair at the charity bazaar of the Women’s Council (WC) of Moscow.  The WC is the largest organization of its kind in Europe devoted to cultural activities and charitable work, with almost a thousand members consisting mostly of expatriates, as its Charter provides that only three percent of its membership can be Russians.  Conchita, who was the Vice President and later President of WC, conversed with Mrs. Putin in Spanish.  Through the WC, Conchita had the privilege of meeting his holiness, Alexy II, the Patriarch of the Russian Orthodox Church.

Women’s day is a very special holiday in Russia when the custom is for men to present flowers to their spouses and dear friends and employees. Another interesting Russian custom observed at the beginning of the year, on the occasion of a religious celebration, is the practice of people going around to greet their relatives and friends and to ask for forgiveness. This way, Russians begin the year with a clean slate.  The Russians celebrate Christmas a week later than we do and the Russian New Year is also a week later.

During our time, the Diplomatic Corps was invited to diplomatic trips by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through U.P.D.K, its unit attending to our housing needs. Our first was a boat trip along the Volga, which made stops at towns with historic churches and monasteries.  The Russian Orthodox Church has its own saints.  Its priest can marry but those who do cannot rise in the Church’s hierarchy.  Another memorable visit was to Tatarstan, a Muslim State and one of the most prosperous in the Russian Federation. 

The ASEAN Ambassadors also had separate organized visits to the regions.  In one of them, our official program included a tour of the Railway University in Siberia, established to train personnel to run the Trans-Siberian Railway.  The Russian railways are vital for Siberia and the Far East regions of Russia.  Russian trains are punctual to the minute and special tourist trains can be inserted in certain sections of the railways without disrupting the regular schedule of trains.  We visited the Academy town in Novosibirsk, where extraordinarily talented children from all over the Soviet Union were sent to study mathematics and physics. This Academy town continues and serves as a center for S&T embryo projects.

One of the most awaited events in Moscow is the annual military parade at Red Square to honor the sacrifices of the millions of Russian people who perished during the Great Patriotic War. It was fascinating to watch the way the parading honor guards tilt their heads sideward (taas noo) as they pass in front of the podium, conveying a sense of seemingly arrogant pride.  Despite their pride in their military, it is difficult to imagine that the Russian people will want to relive the experiences of the Great Patriotic War.

The Russians, while appearing at first sight to be aloof and cold, are really very warm and hospitable people like other Asians, once the ice is broken.  At their receptions, they also serve food lavishly like us, unlike the custom in some European countries where receptions mean finger food and wine.  Drinking vodka with them is a natural way of earning their trust and friendship. We have made it a point to serve vodka the proper way: both the vodka and the small drinking glasses must be chilled.  We congratulate Ambassador Igor Khovaev on the occasion of Russia’s national day.