Ambassador Jaime S.
Bautista, Doctor of laws, and
Secretary General of
the Philippine Ambassadors Foundation
Reviewing the
Visiting Forces Agreement
The Philippines should conduct the negotiations with respect
to the revision of the Visiting Forces Agreement, mindful of the shifts in the
global balance of power, the full range of threats to our security, and all the
options to extend our security, including our economic interests.
Since the signing of the VFA in 1999, there have been
strategic developments both in Asia and elsewhere, and shifts in the axis of
power. The so-called “US pivot to Asia”
is a reaction to these changes taking place.
Historically, the US pivot to Asia may be said to have
begun in the nineteenth century when the United States invaded the Philippine
Islands during the Spanish American War of 1898. This conflict recorded the first misunderstanding
between the Americans and Filipinos, which led to the Philippine American
War. Commodore George Dewey denied that
he had struck a deal with President Emilio Aguinaldo for Philippine support for
the American invasion of the Walled City of Manila. At that time, international law was defined
as the body of rules binding upon “civilized states” in their relations with
one another. The Philippines did not
qualify as a subject of international law, with rights and duties under this
law. This is the background for the
famous anecdote of President William McKinley praying to God, and deciding
thereafter to annex the Philippines.
Clearly, the renegotiation of the VFA provides the
occasion to establish a clear understanding of the scope and conditions for the
visits of US naval vessels, planes and
troops to the Philippines on a proposed “rotational basis.”
This occasion also provides the opportunity for the
Philippines to re-visit the Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) with the United States,
on which the VFA is based, and to address the issues on which there has been
dissatisfaction on the part of critics of this treaty. These include the issue that the MDT does not
provide for automatic operation of the treaty in case of an attack on the
Philippines as in the case of the NATO treaty, that the defense treaty is not
clear on whether it provides protection for the islands and rocks outside the
Philippines’ archipelagic baselines but within its Economic Exclusive Zone
(EEZ), and that the said treaty has not been of sufficient help with respect to
the modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the VFA
signed in 1999 covered only visits approved by the Philippine Government. Nevertheless, as the USA is the world’s
superpower, the Philippines should be mindful of a number of scenarios that
could take place, given the tensions in areas near the Philippines. What will happen, for example, should the
United States launch a military strike against Iran in the Gulf or against
North Korea in the Korean peninsula and the Philippines should opt to stay out
of the conflict? Under international
law, the Philippines would have obligations as a neutral state not to allow its
territory to be used as a staging point.
The Philippines
has a special concern with what happens in the Middle East, the
Gulf, and the Korean peninsula. It has a
big diaspora in countries in all of these potential conflict areas, and this
gives the Philippines a global reach.
A scenario closer to home is conflict taking place in the
Taiwan Straights although this scenario is not likely, given the improved
relations between China and Taiwan. In
the past, the presence of the US Seventh Fleet impeded the invasion of Taiwan
from the Chinese mainland. If war should
break out in the Taiwan Straits, and the United States intervenes, US armed
forces present in the Philippines would be exposed to attack.
Critics of the VFA point to this scenario and argue that
the Philippines should revoke the VFA because they think of the Philippines as
a small country, which will be crushed in a fight between two elephants. Moreover, it is also argued that the USA is a
declining power and that in time, China will become the dominant superpower.
This rising economic superpower is the immediate threat to
the Philippines’ security with it’s armed occupation of Bajo de Masinloc
(Scarborough Shoal) and Mischief Reef and its continuing threat to seize other
submerged features and protruding rocks within the Philippines’ Continental
Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone. It is
through this prism that Filipinos today view the Philippines’ strategic
relations with China.
Some political analysts argue that the crisis over
Masinloc has come about as a result of China’s apprehension to the so-called US
pivot to the Asia Pacific region and its reaction to the increased military
presence of the United States in the Philippines under the Visiting Forces
Agreement. It is China engaging in
shadow boxing with the United States. The Philippines evidently is no match
militarily and has the weakest armed forces in the region, although they have
experience in combat and as peacekeeping forces.
However, the Philippines cannot be thought of as a small
island in the Pacific. The Philippines
is one of the three great archipelagoes located close to the Asian
Continent. At the northern end is Japan,
at the southern end Indonesia and strategically located at the center is the
Philippines. Like Indonesia and Japan,
the Philippines is a large maritime country with the twelfth largest population
in the world. It is the second largest
in ASEAN in terms of human resources and its economy is one of the few bright
spots in the world today.
Not only is the Philippines strategically important
because of its geographical location at the center of the maritime region where
half of the world’s cargo passes but the Philippines plays a strategic role in
international commerce. It is the
backbone of the shipping industry, being the biggest seafaring country in the
world.
These are the strengths that the Philippines brings to the
negotiating table. The main concern of
the Philippines is the protection of its sovereign rights over its continental
shelf and exclusive economic zone. The
Philippines has adopted a three-pronged strategy to achieve this end by
bringing a case before the Arbitral Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, a dialogue
with China bilaterally and in the ASEAN forums, and
inviting the attention of the United States to the
tensions in the West Philippine Sea under its defense arrangements.
The on-going talks on a new Access Agreement on a
“rotational basis” is recognition by the United States of having neglected its
interests in the Asia Pacific and leaving the countries in Southeast Asia
exposed to the growing economic and military power of China. The Philippines was constrained to have its
own pivot to China under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo. The so-called pivot
of the United States to Asia Pacific is
to prevent the region from falling within China’s sphere of influence.
The Philippines has shifted its emphasis on relations with
China and the United States from economic to security interests because of
China’s aggression. As long as China is
engaged along this road, the Philippines will want to have strengthened defense
arrangements with the United States.
The Philippines has benefited from the VFA. It has received assistance in setting up its
Coast Watch System (basically a national radar system for its maritime domain
awareness) related to protecting its marine resources. It has also received assistance in disaster
management as the Philippines is prone to typhoons and other calamities, and
beefing up its national security and counter-terrorism capabilities, important
for Mindanao.
However, the Philippines has received only equivocal
commitments from the United States with respect to the defense of the
Philippines’ sovereign rights in its continental shelf and exclusive economic
zone in the West Philippine Seas unlike the commitment given to Japan over
Japan’s administration of the disputed Senkaku/Diayao Island. Secretary of State Hilary Clinton explicitly
guaranteed US support for all Japanese territory, including the Senkaku/Diayao
Islands, under its Mutual Defense Treaty with Japan.
It should be noted that the Philippines’ mainland is not
perceived to be under threat of external attack. Only its maritime territory is subject to
Chinese aggression. Unless the
Philippines receives a firm commitment like that provided to Japan, the Philippines
should assess the value that the VFA has for the Philippines vis a vis the dangers arising and the
economic losses to be sustained.
In any event, the Philippines should look down the road in
the next years for a cost-benefit analysis of whether security guarantees/
support will continue to be more important than sustained Chinese investment
over the next 20-30 years. As an
alternative to security guarantees, the Philippines should develop a strategy
of building a web of interlocking economic interests as a shield against
external attack. Supporting this strategy would be greater reliance on
international law, which should be a guiding principle of Philippine foreign
policy.
No comments:
Post a Comment