Sunday, November 8, 2020

“Sincere Commitment or Empty words: “China will never seek hegemony, expansionism or sphere of influence (Xi Jinping)"

The South China Sea is one of the busiest highways for international trade.  It is not only in our mutual interest that we safeguard the shipping that passes through it but in the common interest of countries, both inside and outside the region. 

In January 2017, President Xi Jinping gave an inspired talk at Davos, defending economic globalization and portraying China “as adhering to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions.” He went on to say:  “We should honor promises and abide by rules.  One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit.”  His speech at Davos was well received with China being perceived as the new champion of globalization.

However, today, with China flexing its military muscle, the landscape looks different.  China’s aggressive behavior during the past threes years in the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have increased insecurity in our region and have portrayed China as a regional hegemon.  These developments have caused the Belt and Road Initiative to be viewed with suspicion.

In India, China’s investments in the Indian Ocean are seen as Red flags being hoisted all around India. This appears to give momentum to security cooperation among the QUAD countries: India, Australia, Japan and the United States.

China’s investments in the Indian Ocean and in Africa are now being questioned as debt traps, which force developing countries to forfeit their strategic infrastructure and their natural resources to China.

China needs to change this perception.  The success of the Belt and Road Initiative is of immense importance to China and to our region.  China needs peace and stability in the Indo – Pacific region.

Thus, at his address this year to the United Nations General Assembly, President Xi Jinping vowed that China “will never seek hegemony, expansionism, or sphere of influence.”

Earlier, Deng Xiaoping forewarned in his unforgettable message to the UN General Assembly at its Special Session on 10 April 1974:

“If one day, China should change its color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it. “

The world is watching whether China’s actions will match President Xi’ Jinping’s words.  In the post-pandemic era, the world wishes to be governed by the Rule of Law.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in its Preamble, declares that the States Parties are aware of the historic significance of this Convention, as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world.  

Evidently, China has a lot to gain from the legal order established under UNCLOS, which ensures peace and stability in the South China Sea, and conversely, China has a lot to lose, if tension and conflict continue to prevail because of the non-observance of this legal order.

The Philippines and China have historic and cultural ties; we are not only neighbors but also kinfolk.  Let us move two steps forward by restoring the status quo ante when Mischief Reef was not occupied by China and continue with this positive approach by complying with our duty to cooperate under UNCLOS, particularly with the protection of the marine environment and the promotion of sustainable fisheries. 


Sunday, September 20, 2020

PH is not an ant in a battle between two elephants: Vigorous multilateral diplomacy is needed to defend what is ours.

 The Philippines is not an ant between two elephants in our struggle to enforce the Arbitral Ruling promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The UNCLOS is the constitution of the oceans, agreed upon by the international community.

 

Battle is Ours Over Our Maritime Rights

 

The Philippines is not a pawn involved in the power struggle between the United States, as the dominant superpower in the world, and China as the rising star.  The Arbitral Ruling is all about our maritime rights under UNCLOS, as both the Philippines and China are Parties to this multilateral agreement. 

 

This is all about our struggle to protect our fishing rights in our 200-miles Exclusive Economic Zone and its fragile ecosystem and rich biodiversity; to prevent China’s occupation of the Reed Bank ((Recto), which forms part of our Continental Shelf, and to exercise therein our petroleum  and mining rights; and to recover Mischief Reef, also part of our Continental Shelf, which China occupies illegally.

 

The issue of who has sovereignty over the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal was not brought before the Arbitral Tribunal as it is the International Court of Justice which has jurisdiction over issues relating to land.  

 

Maritime rights, on the other hand, deal with issues relating to internal waters, bays, straits, archipelagic waters, territorial seas and the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, the high seas and the deep seabed.

 

The Philippines has been prudent not to take sides in the power struggle between China and the United States.  However, China should note that Filipinos are mindful that it is the United States that seeks to protect the status quo on the law of the sea under UNCLOS, which recognizes the exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states over their Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. 

 

China, on the other hand, seeks to subvert UNCLOS and replace it with its nine-dash-line in order to convert the vast expanse of the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, never mind that the line encroaches on two-thirds of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and those of other ASEAN member states. 

 

Shift to Vigorous Multilateral Diplomacy

 

In defending its permanent paramount interests, the Philippines has apparently moved from quiet bilateral diplomacy to a more active multilateral diplomacy.  Over a period of four years, the Philippines has patiently sought to accommodate China and give it a way to save face.

 

In my column published on 30 May 2020, I noted that the Philippines can no longer afford to continue with its quiet diplomacy with China because this policy places no pressure on China and encourages China to intimidate its neighbors.  In the meantime, much time has been lost to replace the Malampaya oil fields which will soon be depleted. 

 

On 26 June 2020, the 36th ASEAN Summit, which was hosted by Vietnam by virtual mode, declared that UNCLOS is the law that determines maritime entitlements to the EEZ and Continental Shelf, omitting any reference to general international law:

 

“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones.”   “UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out.”   

 

China claims that the UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone is not really exclusive but is modified by general international law based on historic rights.  However, the fictitious nine-dash-line has no historic basis because prior to UNCLOS, the international community recognized the territorial sea and contiguous zone, but beyond there was only the high seas, which was mare liberum.

 

Resort to UN General Assembly

 

The Philippines again may have no choice but to bring the Arbitral Ruling to the UN General Assembly in the same way that the Philippines needed to resort to arbitration under the UNCLOS provisions on “Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions.”  

 

Moral pressure and loss of prestige and credibility is the ultimate sanction on a rogue state when Chapter VII sanctions by the UN Security Council cannot be adopted because of the veto by a Permanent Member.  No state can afford to be a pariah in the international community.

 

For this battle, the Philippines needs to make adequate preparations on a timetable based on pragmatic considerations.  The first opportunity to explain the Arbitral Ruling to the world and to the Chinese people is when our head of state or his representative is scheduled in these coming months to address the UN General Assembly.

 

Having remained quiet about the Arbitral Ruling, the Philippines should now avail of every opportunity to explain the Arbitral ruling at relevant international and regional forums.  ASEAN provides many venues for this, with the “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” providing an overarching theme.

 

Activate The “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific”

 

Thus, the Philippines’ engagement should actively push for the activation of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”  Southeast Asia lies at the center of these two dynamic regions, as pointed out in the Rationale for this initiative.

 

Prominent among the areas of cooperation for this initiative is maritime cooperation. Among others, this includes:  firstly, to prevent unsustainable exploitation of marine resources through overfishing and the destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity; secondly, to promote sustainable management of marine resources and support small- scale fishing activities; and thirdly to promote connectivity through maritime commerce and the development of the blue economy.  

 

This ties up well with our most important and urgent objective in bringing China to arbitration: food security.  It is not petroleum but fish which is the most valuable resource of our Exclusive Economic Zone. 

 

China has the biggest fishing fleets in the world and subsidizes them, ignoring its obligations to cooperate in the management and conservation of the living resources of the sea and the protection of the marine environment. 

 

Post-Covid-19 World Order

 

It is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the shaping of the economic and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The underlying principle for promoting cooperation is ASEAN centrality to achieve peace, security, stability and prosperity in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

 

As explained in the white paper on the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, the way to promote it includes strategic discussions in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Plus One, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus.  

 

The Outlook also recognizes the potential for cooperation with other regional mechanisms.  Maritime Cooperation, Connectivity and Food Security are relevant issues for APEC, whose mission is to promote and accelerate regional economic integration and to enhance human security.

 

These discussions will provide a preview of what the Post Covid-19 World Order may look like:  how much of the status quo will be preserved and how much will change.  We must seize the opportunity in these strategic talks to contribute ideas and show leadership to advance the common interest of humanity and our national interest.

 

Conclusion

 

The challenge ahead is not for an ant. But we are a populous country, the thirteenth in the world and the second in ASEAN, with a huge diaspora in the continents of the globe.  

 

We have a proud history in diplomacy, being a founding member and a signatory of the United Nations Charter, a founding member of ASEAN, and the first democracy in Asia.  In these roles, we actively supported the emergence of the Third World.

 

The Philippines is present in the UN logo as a dot and that dot reacted in a big way, pushing for the insertion of the word “self-determination” in the UN Charter.  

 

In the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines successfully introduced the concept of the Archipelagic State in the Convention.

 

As the UN Charter is the expression of the peoples of the world, we should prepare to have a corresponding big voice in the discussions in the United Nations system of what the Post Covid-19 World Order will be. 

 


Saturday, May 30, 2020

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista

Four of Four Parts on the Notice to Terminate the VFA: PH should keep its friends and raise its voice in ASEAN to defend its permanent interests.

On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China, I reminisce about my tour of duty in Peking from 1976 to 1979 and my experience in the 1980s, and reflect on the many changes that have occurred in the relations of the Philippines with China and other States.

No Permanent Friends, No Permanent Enemies

The relations between states are dynamic, sometimes determined by the personality and ambitions of their leaders.  Thus, Lord Palmerston, the noted British Prime Minister, and other statesmen have observed that as between states, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests.  This is true of both the Philippines and China.  The Philippines, however, should keep its friends, especially at a time when its sovereignty and territorial integrity are under threat.

The Philippines has the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States but the United States was once the enemy.  The Commonwealth of the Philippines fought against Japan during the Second World War because the Philippines was on the brink of becoming independent.  The Philippines now has strategic relations with Japan for economic and security reasons.

China fought the United States and the Philippines in the Korean War because the United States and allied troops, bearing the flag of the United Nations, crossed the 38th Parallel after driving back the North Korean invaders.  This was the era of the Cold War when China and the Soviet Union were on the same side.

The Sino-Soviet split on ideology after the demise of Josef Stalin and his succession by Nikita Kruschev marked the Soviet Union as China’s main antagonist.  This allowed the surprise Nixon visit to Peking in 1972, and initially the exchange of Liaison Offices.  The normalization of relations between China and the United States followed on 1 January 1979.  

1976 as Year of Great Changes in China

I was cross-posted from Kuala Lumpur to Peking in 1976, when great changes took place in China. It was the year of the demise of the triumvirate; Zhou Enlai (Head of Government ) in January, Zhu  Deh (Head of State) in May, and Mao Zedong (Head of Party) in September.  Earlier in April, the Gang of Four headed by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, had succeeded in deposing Deng Xiaoping a second time.      

The great earthquake in Tangshan took place in July, an omen of the fall of a dynasty according to Chinese belief.  With Mao’s demise two months later, the Gang of Four lost in the “Struggle Session” which ensued, leading to the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping, the author of China’s modernization.

The big question was whether Premier Hua Guafeng could retain power as Mao’s chosen successor.  I reported that Deng would return because he was with the Long March and his Comrades were around.  His economic views were pragmatic reflected in his comment: “It does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”  Hua’s experience was limited to the rural economy.  He lasted for several years but eventually lost influence to Deng whom I predicted in a report I authored would rise to become China’s paramount leader.

Great Leaders

Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and King Norodom Sihanouk were among the great leaders I had the pleasure of meeting in Peking. 

I had the privilege of meeting Deng for the first time, when as Charge ad interim, I helped send off Vice Premier Li Xiannian, for his official visit to Manila.  Deng was there to impress upon the importance of the visit. He was very nice, posing for a picture with me and my spouse and the Embassy staff.

Li’s visit to the Philippines was a success.  My wife and I had the honor of meeting him and his spouse at the Great Hall of the People on multiple occasions at either the dinners (as Charge a.i.) or the return dinners (as Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes’s substitute) for the State Visits.  Li and his wife would break out into big smiles upon seeing me and my wife in our barong and Filipina dress during the Protocol to introduce the guests.  Li became president of China from June 1983 to April 1988.

China was very active promoting itself as the leader of the developing countries and the socialist camp. Selected leaders from the Third World and the Second World who were not considered as being subservient to the Soviet Union were invited and lavishly feted.  

Among the Heads of State I shook hands with were leaders subsequently deposed like Khmer Rouge’s Pol Pot and Central African Emperor Jean Bedal Bokassa, as well as those who suffered a worse fate, such as being executed or assassinated like Romania’s Nicolae Ceaucescu, Equatorial Guinea’s Francisco Macias Ngume and North Yemen’s Ibrahim al-Hamdi  and his South Yemen counterpart.

 I was privileged to meet Deng again when he received the tourism delegation headed by GSIS and Manila Hotel President Roman Cruz, Jr.  I recall Cruz warning Deng of tourism pollution.  The Philippines helped train the Chinese hotel industry.  When Deng made a speech proposing air bridges between Peking and Taipei which I reported to the DFA, Philippine Airlines became the first airline allowed by China to fly to both Peking and Taipei.

As for the survivor and astute statesman that Sihanouk showed himself to be, I met him when he invited Ambassador Reyes and the entire Philippine Embassy staff  (all were accredited with diplomatic rank) to celebrate at his palace on the occasion of Cambodia’s New Year.  Because of this invitation, I postponed my departure for my cross-posting to the Court of St. James.  Sihanouk was in exile in Peking as China’s guest when Vietnam installed the Heng Samrin regime.

China-Vietnam War

 Before Cambodia’s New Year celebration took place, the Sino-Vietnamese war broke out. Deng had just visited the United States. I seemed to be lucky to be the Charge’ at such times of crisis.  China had been hinting that Vietnam would be taught a lesson for invading Democratic Kampuchea, China’s ally.  Vietnam was seen as the Soviet Union’s Cuba proxy in Asia.

I recall that elsewhere in the world, the Soviet Union seemed to be tilting the balance of global power in its favor, with Cuba’s intervention in Angola.  The Soviet Union also had success at the Horn of Africa when Ethiopia joined the Soviet Camp and thwarted Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden region.  Vietnam’s invasion which installed the Heng Samrin regime was, therefore, more intolerable.

My luck seemed to hold, because I recall that, while taking a stroll after dinner near our residential building, I encountered the spouse of a fellow diplomat.  She looked at me in surprise, saying: “Jimmy, why are you not at your Embassy?”  Her husband was at their Liaison Office, reporting that the invasion had begun.  I rushed to our Embassy.

I recall that the invasion took place on the eve of the luncheon invitation hosted by the Malaysian Ambassador in honor of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping who had returned from a successful visit of Malaysia and Singapore.   Foreign Minister Huang Hua was the official designated to represent Deng.

In preparation for this event, the Malaysian deputy chief of mission, Mr. Nik Mohamed, had met with me and our Thai counterpart to discuss current issues. At that time, only Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines had Embassies in Peking.  Mohamed requested me to avoid touching on the sensitive issue of Vietnam.

Voice Radio

During the luncheon celebration, I could not avoid mentioning this important issue.  It was  not every day that I was at a small table with my wife, dining with the Chinese Foreign Minister.  When I broached the subject, I saw the Malaysian and Thai Ambassadors lean noticeably forward to listen.  Huang Hua switched from English to Mandarin.

I used the occasion of the conflict to renew our Embassy’s request for permission to have voice radio.  At that time, only countries considered as China’s special friends were permitted the use of voice radio.  The rest were allowed to send and receive messages by radio only through Morse code.  I succeeded in getting the voice radio, where others could not.

Cambodian New Year

I enjoyed the Cambodian New Year’s celebration.  Sihanouk was the artist and charismatic figure that he strived to be.  He was seated alone, at a table separated from the guests, as if on a throne.  His wife, the lovely Princess Monique, was across the room with other prominent guests.

Sihanouk gave the Philippines special attention. Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes had presented to him a tape of Filipino songs, including “Dahil sa Iyo” sang by First Lady Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.  Sihanouk highlighted her rendition and played the entire tape during the interval. The party ended with a Filipino song.  Sihanouk also seemed to have anticipated  the importance of a future event.

ICRC Convention in Manila

In 1981, The Philippines was scheduled to  host the Convention of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Manila through the efforts of the First Lady.  This was the time when ASEAN and China opposed the Heng Samrin’s regime bid to be seated at the UN.  The regime sought to be present at this ICRC Convention. The ICRC rules specified that the Red Cross actually in place in the country should be the one entitled to participate in the Conference. 

Because the ICRC threatened to move the Conference to another venue, the DFA instructed the Philippine Mission in Geneva to discuss the matter with the ICRC.  However, the task fell upon me as Charge ad interim in London because the ICRC President, a British subject, was in England

The ASEAN London Committee declined my request to be present at the meeting.  The ICRC President expressed great displeasure that the Heng Samrin Red Cross could not get visas, arguing vigorously he had received assurances from the First Lady but I told him this was an ASEAN position. The Conference in Manila took place as scheduled without any Red Cross delegation from Cambodia.

Multilateral Cooperation as Developing Countries

The China I knew was a developing country working in harmony with countries of the Third World.  China was active in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea as was the Philippines. The Conference readily accepted the principle of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but some fishing Powers sought to share in the sovereign rights of the EEZ States. China opposed this attempt to dilute the exclusiveness of the EEZ.

Even before the entry into effect of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice recognized that State practice had accepted the principles of the EEZ and Continental Shelf .

The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea that may extend up to 200 miles, reserved for the economic benefit of the population of the adjacent state.

The Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the land territory of a coastal state that lies beyond the territorial sea and beneath the EEZ up to 200 miles or beyond, under certain conditions. These are maritime zones adjacent to a State, as opposed to land, which must have features permanently above the sea.

All the countries bordering the South China Sea base their sovereign rights to exploit the resources of their adjoining maritime zones on the principles of the EEZ and Continental Shelf.   But China now claims to have rights across the vast expanse of the South China Sea based on a 9-Dash-Line, contradicting its stand at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

China as Regional Hegemon

Today, China is an economic superpower and the hegemon in our region.   Because of its military superiority, China has been aggressive in encroaching on the maritime zones of ASEAN countries across the South China Sea.

When the Philippines filed its Complaint against China, to declare the Nine-Dash-Line as having no legal effect, China abused the Philippines and refused to comply with the Compulsory Procedures for Settlement of Disputes under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.  The Philippines was simply enforcing its sovereign right for peaceful settlement of the dispute.

What is it that makes an economic power become a bully and a new colonial imperialist, and act as though it has the right to be a tyrant?  This phenomenon was observed by no less than Deng Xiaoping when he said:

“If one day, China should change its color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it. “

So, Deng was telling the Chinese people: Don’t take other people for granted.  And telling other people: Don’t sell yourselves short.

Permanent Interests

Contrary to fake news being propagated, the Arbitral Award was not issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which simply acted as the Registrar (Secretariat).

The Arbitral Tribunal was a UN tribunal constituted pursuant to Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The President of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea appointed four of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal, including its President, due to China’s refusal to take part in the proceedings.

China’s refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal had no effect on its standing.   Article 9 of the Annex of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea provides that “Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings” while Article 11 provides that “the award shall be final and without appeal.”

The Philippines’ permanent interests should dictate its foreign policy.  Such is the the Arbitral Award against China which protects the Philippines sovereign rights to its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and its Continental Shelf in the West Philippine Sea. 

Almost four years have passed since the Arbitral Award was published.  The Philippines chose to engage China in quiet diplomacy to allow a cooling off period because of China’s unjustified angry reaction.

During his fifth visit to China, President told President Xi Jinping that, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “the arbitral award was final, binding and without appeal.”

Need for New Diplomacy

Much time has been lost for replacing the Malampaya oil fields, which will be depleted soon. The Philippines’ food security is also at risk, ominously at this time of the Covid 19 pandemic, with Filipino fishermen being harassed to prevent them from fishing in their traditional fishing grounds. 

The Philippines can no longer afford to continue with quiet diplomacy, which places no pressure on China and encourages China to intimidate its neighbors. 

The recent behavior of China’s Navy in its encounters with the Philippine Navy and the Malaysian Navy during this Covid-19 crisis does not inspire much hope that China will choose a face saving way   to abandon the fiction of the nine-dash-line. 

On 17 February 2020, the Chinese corvette with bow No. 514 trained its radar guns on BRP Conrado Yap  (PS 39) when the latter was on sovereign patrol mission within Philippine waters. The Philippines refused to be intimidated and filed a Protest.

The Philippines should now signal its determination to enforce the Arbitral Award by putting it on record in the ASEAN forums.  The negotiations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China should uphold the Arbitral Award.

China has institutional links with ASEAN as a Dialogue Partner, a member of ASEAN Plus 3, a member of the ASEAN East Asia Summit and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum.  China is also a member of APEC in which the ten ASEAN member countries have a central role. The Philippines needs to resonate its voice in these forums, including through more recent communication technologies in this new era of lockdowns, and to tell the true story to the Chinese people and the whole world.

Thucydides Trap

The world has turned full circle since the Sino-Soviet split.  In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is now ten.

The Cold War has ended, the Soviet Union has disappeared and a strong Russia has emerged.  China and Russia are friends, having resolved their territorial differences. China is now challenging the United States’ dominant position in the global order, having long prepared for leadership. 

The Philippines seems unable to see on time the reefs that can sink the nation, although like China, its people have shown the will to defend their homeland.

In the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, even though China is the security threat, the Philippines has common stand with China on the protection of their maritime zones. Both maintain that foreign warships need to give notice and request permission to enter their territorial sea.  This is opposed to the view of the Maritime Powers.
  
On the issue of military exercises in the EEZ, the Convention contains a provision in Article 301 providing for “the peaceful uses of the seas” and the obligation of States Parties “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”  

Applying this article to the EEZ, some countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Uruguay, take the position that, in the EEZ, foreign military exercises and maneuvers, including the right to use weapons, are only permissible with the consent of the coastal state.  China has not made a declaration supporting this view.  I think that it is in the long- term interest of the Philippines to support this view.

Cambodia is not a Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea but it is in Cambodia’s interest to be in solidarity with ASEAN on fundamental issues of regional concern, such as on the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea.

Will China’s present leaders listen to Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation and give utmost attention to ASEAN’s concerns about the militarization of the South China Sea to avoid the Thucydides Trap? Already, China has warned of the risk of a new Cold War with the issue of the origin of the new Corona virus.

The Philippines should move for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific to be well defined and to be put into practice so that it can achieve a Sea of Peace, Stability and Progress.  China should value its friendship with the Philippines and support this effort.

Saturday, April 4, 2020

Third of Four Parts on the Notice to Terminate the VFA: Because China refuses to abide by International Law, PH should not gamble on its security.

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Jaime S. Bautista

Third of Four Parts on the Notice to Terminate the VFA:  Because China refuses to abide by International Law, PH should not gamble on its security

While the world’s attention has been diverted to Covid-19, China has remained focused on its strategy of building artificial islands in order to take control of the South China Sea.

Recently, Xinhua News Agency announced that China’s Academy of Science has established “two research stations” on Subi Reef (Zamora) and Fiery Cross Reef (Kagitingan) and that “Scientists [will] live and conduct field research on ecology, geology and environment. “
China’s action is controversial because Subi Reef falls within Thitu’s  (Pag-asa) 12- mile territorial sea, according to the finding of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Arbitration Tribunal.  Furthermore, China’s declared purpose should remind us that when China first occupied Mischief Reef, its pretext was that it was building a platform where fishermen regardless of nationality could take refuge.
The strength of the Philippines’ alliances is an important element in any strategy of preventing China from taking control of the South China Sea and encroaching on the Philippines’ territorial and maritime rights.
While the Notice to terminate the VFA has been criticized, it has provided an urgent need for consultations to assess what impact the Notice will have on the Mutual Defense Agreement (MDT) and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and the United States.
In view of the sensitivity of security matters, each of the Contracting Parties will certainly evaluate whether the other remains a reliable partner.

Inherent Right to Collective Defense

On the issue of sovereignty, the UN Charter recognizes the inherent right of a state to individual and collective defense, and declares that this right shall not be impaired.  The right of individual and collective defense is an exercise of sovereignty and protects a state’s right to exist.

The defense agreements of the Philippines with the United States do not threaten any third state.  
The PH-US MDT complies with the UN Charter and provides that, in case of an armed attack, the Contracting Parties shall immediately report the armed attack and the measures taken to the Security Council.

Both the Philippines and the United States signed the MDT, the VFA, and EDCA after an appreciation of their respective national interests. 

Philippines’ Security Concerns

In the case of the Philippines, the defense agreements with the United States were entered into to meet both traditional and non-traditional security threats to the Philippines.

The Philippines has a policy of amity with all nations but it cannot ignore the fact that the main external threat to the Philippines is China.   China has refused to abide by the Award of the UN Arbitration Tribunal and claims to own the South China Sea.

China continues to occupy Mischief Reef (Panganiban), a low tide elevation which is within the Philippines EEZ, is part of the Philippines’ Continental Shelf, and over which no State can claim sovereignty.  The Philippines has sovereign rights and jurisdiction over Mischief Reef.

China also occupies Hughes Reef, which the Arbitration Tribunal identified as distinct from McKennan (Chigua Reef) and which the Philippines considered as part of McKennan (Chigua Reef).  Hughes Reef is also a low tide elevation within the Philippines EEZ. but it is located within 12 nautical miles of high tide features on MacKennan (Chigua Reef) and Sin Cowe.

China further demands joint development of the oil resources within the Philippines’ EEZ, otherwise China has threatened to go to war.  This has persuaded the Philippines to enter into negotiations with China for joint development of oil reserves in the Reed Bank.

China has naval forces to prevent the Philippines from re-supplying the BRP Sierra Madre, which was ran aground to prevent China from occupying the Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal) located in the area of the Reed Bank.  The presence of China’s naval forces for this purpose violates the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  Navigation means passing through and freedom of navigation carries the obligation of exercising the right in a peaceful manner.

China employs what is known as the cabbage strategy to intimidate Filipino fishermen from fishing in Philippines’ EEZ and at Scarborough Shoal, and to enable its fishermen to harvest fish in Philippine waters unimpeded. This strategy employs hundreds of Chinese militia boats, which carry arms, to swarm and intimidate through sheer numbers. 

When this strategy was used to encircle Pag-asa Island (Thitu, which is technically a rock) in Kalayaan Island Group (none of which is technically an island), the Philippines protested.  President Rodrigo Duterte called China’s attention that this risks a war because Philippine soldiers are stationed there.

The Cabbage Strategy has been effective in the salami slicing of Philippine maritime reefs and rocks.  China has built and fortified seven artificial islands in the South China Sea.  Two of them are rocks – Johnson Reef (Mabini) and  McKennan Reef (Chigua) - inside the Philippines EEZ.  Asean has called for the non-militarization of these artificial islands.

The land reclamations of these artificial islands have destroyed coral reefs, resulting in the depletion of fish stocks and threatening the food security of the entire region.

Finally, China has seized Scarborough Shoal (Bajo de Masinloc), which is not part of the Spratlys. These are rocks, over which the Philippines has sovereignty, which were used by US forces as target practice when the US had bases at Clark and Subic.  China was seen to be preparing to convert Bajo de Masinloc into a military base, but then Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay, Jr. warned China that this would be a game changer in bilateral relations.

Value of VFA
The Mutual Defense Treaty provides for defense against an armed attack.  The VFA and EDCA are supplementary agreements designed to make the MDT effective.
The VFA addresses traditional as well as non-traditional security threats such as terrorism, natural disasters and calamities, trafficking in persons and drugs, cyber crimes and others.   
The MDT without the VFA was described by Foreign Secretary Teodoro L. Locsin as a deflated balloon.  The termination of the VFA will effectively render the EDCA inoperable. The EDCA allows the prepositioning of US personnel and resources in the Philippines to allow for quick response to security threats.  Without the presence of forces, the MDT may be unable to deter an armed attack in time.  Thus, Japan and South Korea have US bases in their countries.

These supplementary agreements have already proven to be of invaluable assistance. The VFA made it possible for the United States Navy to give immediate aid to the Yolanda victims who were inaccessible because of our Government’s limited capabilities.  They allowed US personnel to assist in providing intelligence operations for the battle of Marawi in 2017.  They continue to provide for modern training in maritime security and amphibious operations invaluable for the defense of our EEZ as well as for counter terrorism operations.  As stated by Locsin, they are the substance that makes the MDT work.

Value of PH-US Mutual Defense Treaty
The Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) under Article 4 provides that  “An armed attack on either of the Parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the metropolitan territory of either of the Parties, or on the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.”
Examining Article 4, the PH-US MDT covers an armed attack on the Philippines either: 1) “on the metropolitan territory of the Philippines; 2) on the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean, and 3) its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.” 

US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo has assured the Philippines that an attack on the Philippines’ armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in the South China Sea is covered by the MDT:

“As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific, any armed attack on any Philippine forces, aircraft, or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our Mutual defense treaty."

Thus, an armed attack on the Philippine marines on BRP Sierra Madre, which guards the Ayungin Shoal in the Reed Bank, will trigger the MDT.  So too will an armed attack on the Philippine government vessels supplying the marines.  Likewise, an armed attack on the Philippine forces stationed in Pag-asa will trigger the MDT.

Expanded Coverage

However, the Philippines’ metropolitan territory is not perceived to be under threat of attack and the Philippines could be exposed to nuclear attack if war breaks out between the United States and China.

This is not likely because it is in the interest of both countries to promote peace, their economies being intertwined.  Moreover, China recognizes that it is still a developing country (its hinterland is largely undeveloped) and cannot match the US in military power.  A limited conflict, however, may occur due to, for example, collision of ships or aircraft arising from freedom of navigation operations in the South China Sea.

On the other hand, China as a threat to the Philippines’ security is present and real.  The PH-US MDT serves as a deterrent.  While it is in the US interest to promote peace with China, it will have to act to meet the common danger if China attacks the Philippines.   The US credibility will be at stake if it does not.

The risk of being exposed to nuclear attack should entitle the Philippines to an expanded coverage by the Mutual Defense Treaty, to include its EEZ and Continental Shelf.   This would serve to protect oil and gas fields that the Philippines may build with other countries like the US.

The Arbitral Tribunal has ruled with finality that the Philippines has exclusive sovereign rights to its 200-mile EEZ and Continental Shelf because China has no valid overlapping claims. 

The terms of the MDT should also cover Pag-asa and other rocks in Kalayan where the Philippines exercises effective jurisdiction. Under Article 4 of the MDT, an armed attack is deemed to include “an armed attack … on the Island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific Ocean”

Similarly, Japan’s Senkaku is covered by the US-Japan Security Treaty because Article 5 thereof commits the United States to defend aggression against territories under Japanese administration. 

Modernization of  AFP

Finally, the Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ is an important issue to discuss.
The primary responsibility to defend Philippines’ territory and its resources remains with its armed forces, its Coast Guard and its other government entities. 

The Philippines needs ships and airplanes to prevent poaching of its fisheries and to defend its oil and gas in its Reed Bank.  Guerilla or asymmetric tactics cannot adequately protect these resources; vigilant patrolling is also needed. 

With its relatively small national budget, the Philippines will need to spend its money wisely and to source its materiel under the best possible terms.  Moreover, its resources will not be sufficient to acquire the armaments and equipment needed to modernize its armed forces within a short time.

Pragmatic considerations oblige the United States to assist the Philippines under honorable terms. The Philippines is the weak link in the United States forward defense in the Pacific.  This defense strategy appears to be a core interest of the US.

CONCLUSION

The Notice to Terminate the VFA has given urgency to discussing security. The Philippines should enter into negotiations for better terms for the MDT and the VFA.  The absence of Philippines’ defense alliance with the US will unnecessarily weaken the Philippines’ negotiating position vis-à-vis China.  The Philippines’ presently has no credible defense against China’s Nine-Dash-Line without the US deterrent. 

The Philippines cannot afford to gamble on security.

 Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista, Doctor of Laws, is Vice President of the Philippine Ambassadors’ Foundation, Inc. and of the Philippine Council For Foreign Relations.