PHILIPPINES HAS INHERENT RIGHTS TO ITS 200-MILE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND EEZ UNDER UNCLOS AND CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW

Introduction

China continues to violate the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf, in defiance of the Arbitral Ruling, and even though China has its own 200-mile EEZ and continental shelf adjacent to its mainland, located across the vast South China Sea.  Lately, China has employed gray zone tactics in the vicinity of Julian Felipe Reef (Whitsun Reef) located within the Philippines continental shelf as well as around Pag-asa (Thitu Islands) in the Kalayaan Island Group over which the Philippines exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction.

The EEZ and continental shelf of a coastal State may extend up to 200-miles unless they overlap with those of a neighboring country. (A coastal State may claim an expanded continental shelf if not impeded by an overlapping continental shelf.) It would take the South China Sea to shrink hundreds of nautical miles before China’s EEZ and continental shelf overlap with ours. 

Philippines has Rights To 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone

President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Presidential Decree 1599 on 11 June 1978, establishing the Philippines’ EEZ which extends to a distance of 200 hundred nautical miles, provided that where it overlaps with that of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement.  This Presidential Decree, which has the status of law, is in accord with the provisions of Unclos. 

The International Court of Justice recognized the status of the EEZ as part of customary international law in 1984.  (See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, Canada v. United States of America, (1984) ICJ Rep 246, 94)  

Thus, even before the entry into force of the Convention in 1994, the establishment of its 200-mile EEZ by the Philippines was the practice of States based on the negotiated and agreed text of this Convention and recognized as part of customary international law.

Philippines has Rights to 200-Mile Continental Shelf

President Marcos signed Proclamation NO. 370 on 20 March 1968, declaring the adjacent area to the Philippines’ coast as the Philippines’ continental shelf.  This was a proclamation, not a law, which was issued in accordance with the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.  Article 2 (3) of this treaty provides that “The rights of the coastal State do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express proclamation.”  

Thus, the Philippines did not need to issue any Proclamation at all.  In 1969, the International Court of Justice ruled that Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf had become part of customary internal law.  (See North Sea Continental Shelf (1969) ICJ Rep 3) 

In the abovementioned case, the International Court of Justice repeatedly emphasized the concept of natural prolongation and adopted the ipso jure doctrine with respect to the continental shelf. The Court declared:

“The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso jure and ab initio by virtue of its sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring the sea bed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right.”  (Underscoring mine.)

The UN Convention on the Law of Sea extended the outer limits of the continental shelf to a distance of two hundred nautical miles, modifying the exploitability criterion of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.  

In 1985, the International Court of Justice recognized that the provision of Unclos extending the coastal State’s continental shelf to a distance of up to 200 nautical miles had attained the status of customary international law. (See Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 13; 81 ILR p. 239.)

The Court’s decision took into account that Libya was not a Party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf while, on the other hand, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea had not yet entered into force. 

Arbitral Ruling: China has no Historic Rights Under Nine-Dash-Line which Contravenes UNCLOS

The Philippines rights to a 200-mile EEZ and 200-mile continental shelf facing China are, therefore, firmly based on both customary international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and confirmed by the Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

The Philippines filed the case against China because China sought to seize two/thirds of the Philippines EEZ and Continental Shelf with its claim to historic rights on the basis of its so-called nine-dash-line.   In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef and converted it into a fortified artificial island but it is a low-tide elevation, which forms part of the Philippines’ continental shelf and cannot be subject to appropriation. In 2012, many years after the entry in force of UNCLOS, China seized Scarborough Shoal by force and continues through its military might to prevent the Philippines from exercising its rights. This is a rock well within the Philippines continental shelf and is, therefore, not terra nullius. Its seizure and maintenance by force by China violates the UN Charter, Article 2 (4) thereof.  (Under the Philippine Constitution and Republic Act 1922, Scarborough Shoal is Philippine territory.)

A coastal State has a right to 200-mile EEZ and 200-mile continental Shelf, unless its EEZ or continental shelf overlaps with the EEZ or continental shelf of another State.  China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf adjacent to its mainland and adjacent islands are separated from those of the Philippines by a vast ocean.   

The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that China could not claim to have overlapping EEZ or continental shelf with those of the Philippines either on the basis of its nine-dash-line or by drawing archipelagic or straight baselines from the Spratly islands.

China’s claim to historic rights over the maritime areas covered by the nine-dash-line contravenes the provisions of UNCLOS that the coastal State has exclusive rights to its EEZ and its continental shelf; China cannot claim to share such rights.  If such rights existed, they were superseded by the provisions of UNCLOS, the Tribunal ruled. 

However, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that China never had such historic rights.  Before the EEZ became part of customary international law, coastal States had rights only to a territorial sea. Beyond the territorial sea, there were only the high seas, open to all States.  With respect to the seabed, its use beyond the territorial sea was also open to all States, although the technology to use it was absent.

 

China could not likewise claim overlapping on the basis of high-tide features in the Spratly Islands because none of these are entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf.   The Arbitral Tribunal declared that China could not draw archipelagic baselines from the Spratly Islands as this would violate Unclos because China is not an archipelagic state.  Neither could China draw straight baselines from there because this would also contravene UNCLOS.   Article 7 provides that straight baselines may be employed only “In localities where the coastline is deeply indented and cut into, or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast in its immediate vicinity.”

As there is no overlapping of maritime boundaries between the Philippines and China, the Philippines’s EEZ and continental shelf evidently extend up to 200 nautical miles in the area facing China. Otherwise stated, China has no EEZ or continental shelf to restrict the extent of the Philippines’ EEZ or continental shelf in the area facing China. 

The question of whether there may be overlapping of maritime areas of the Philippines with those of other countries, is irrelevant because the overlapping would cover a different area.  For this reason, Vietnam acknowledged that the Arbitral Tribunal had jurisdiction over this case filed by the Philippines against China, and no country asked to intervene in the case.  

Philippines has inherent rights to the rocks located within its continental shelf

The Arbitral Tribunal was not asked to rule on the issue of sovereignty over the rocks, whether located within or outside the Philippines’ EEZ/continental shelf.  It is the ICJ that has jurisdiction over issues of sovereignty.

 

The issue placed before the Tribunal was whether particular features in the Spratly Islands were either an island with full maritime rights, a rock entitled only to a territorial sea, or a law-tide elevation or submerged feature forming part of the continental shelf of a coastal State.  This was to determine the issue of sovereign rights relating to overlapping of maritime rights. The Philippines did not concede in the Arbitration case that China was in lawful occupation of the artificial islands, which it seized illegally through its military might. 

The Philippines has inherent rights to the rocks located within the Philippines’ continental shelf under Unclos and customary international law.  Article 77 (3) of Unclos expressly provides that “(t)he rights of the coastal State over its continental shelf do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or on any express proclamation.” As stated by the International Court of Justice, they are ipso jure and ab initio; in short, they are inherent rights.

From the inherent nature of the continental shelf follows the retroactivity of the continental shelf doctrine.  As explained by the eminent writer on the Law of the Sea, Daniel Patrick O’Connell, the effect of the doctrine of retroactivity with respect to the continental shelf is “to annul any priority of claim in time or nature over the rights of the coastal state, so that, for example, the doctrines of historic rights or acquisitive prescription would not be available.”  

As a signatory to Unclos when this treaty was opened for signature in 1982, China was obliged to refrain from committing acts, which would defeat the object or purpose of this treaty, as it never announced thereafter any intention to withdraw from the treaty  (See Art 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which China is a Party.) Indeed, China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on 7 June 1996 and became fully bound by it.  

As noted by the Arbitral Tribunal, this Convention was intended to be the constitution of the oceans to comprehensively allocate all the maritime areas of the oceans, so that the illegal occupation of any maritime area in the globe would violate either the rights of another coastal State, or infringe on the rights of all States to the common heritage of mankind or violate the freedom of the high seas.

Therefore, after signing the UNCLOS treaty on 10 December 1982, China was obliged to respect the Philippines’ 200-mile EEZ and 200-mile continental shelf.  The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized in 1985 that the concept of the continental shelf was part of customary international law. The ICJ previously declared in 1984 that the 200-mile EEZ created by Unclos had previously attained the status of customary international law. In view thereof, it became illegal for any State to occupy rocks or islets located within the EEZ/continental shelf of another State as China has done.  Such rocks or islets cannot be viewed as terra nullius. 

Again, it needs to be emphasized that the coastal State’s rights to its continental shelf are ipso jure and ab initio, without need of any proclamation or occupation, effective or notional.  On the other hand, the State claiming rights by occupation needs to prove effective occupation.

China never occupied any of the Philippine rocks (which China later converted into fortified artificial islands)  before 1988, when it seized Johnson Reef by force.  Therefore, China cannot claim rights either on the basis of occupation, prescription (historic rights), accretion or conquest.  China does not claim rights by virtue of cession. 

Not having title, China is unlawfully occupying the rocks located within the Philippines EEZ and continental shelf, and as a corollary, cannot exercise sovereignty over their adjacent seas.   

Enforcement of Arbitral Award

The Arbitral Award covered only the Philippines sovereign rights to its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and continental shelf.   It did not cover issues of sovereignty over which the ICJ has jurisdiction and beyond the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal.

It may be noted that the Philippine Supreme Court, in the case of Republic v. Palawan (G.R. No. 170867 dated January 21, 2021) stated that the Philippines’ sovereignty and jurisdiction over the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) is based on Presidential Decree No. 1596.  The Court noted that the Arbitral Tribunal measured the Philippines’ 200-mile continental shelf from the province of Palawan with respect to the disputed reefs and that the Tribunal declared that the geological features in the KIG (Spratlys) can have only a 12-mile territorial sea under Unclos.

The enforcement of the Award on the issue of sovereign rights is based on the good faith of the Parties to fulfill the obligations they assumed under the Convention.  Thus, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) is the key Department of the Philippine Government assisting the President of the Philippines in seeking the enforcement of the Arbitral Award.   The Department of National Defense (DND), the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and other government agencies like the Bureau of Aquatic Resources (BFAR) have the task of supporting the DFA as the country’s first line of defense. 

  

China’s obligations under the Award may be viewed as either positive obligations, when they require China, for example, to leave Mischief Reef, or negative obligations, when they require China not to interfere with the Philippines rights to fish in its EEZ or to dig oil wells in its Continental Shelf.  Evidently, the task of persuading China to comply with its positive obligations will be a herculean task.  That of protecting our fishing and mining rights, though difficult against an expansionist hegemon, is feasible by combining the Philippines’ negotiating skill with the strength of our alliances and the pressure of public opinion in the community of nations.

The urgent task of the DND, the AFP and the PCG is to ensure that China does not build any more structures within our EEZ/continental shelf, mindful of China’s record of employing gray zone tactics and its cabbage strategy to unlawfully seize and build artificial islands.  

The other immediate need is for the AFP and PCG to patrol our EEZ and continental shelf to prevent China from plundering our resources, particularly the fish and other living resources in our EEZ, and undermining our food security.

As a retired Foreign Service Officer, I note that the DFA is manned by experienced career officers dedicated to the service of our country, as is the case with the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  

We ask Filipinos everywhere to unite and speak with one voice in supporting our government in its duty to defend our country’s sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction for the sake of present and   future generations.

(Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista is Vice President and Chair of the Diplomatic Cluster of the Philippine Council for Foreign Relations and Vice President of the Philippine Ambassadors’ Foundation Inc.  He is a member of the Philippine Bar, Doctor of Laws obtained from the  Universidad Cumpletense de Madrid and former professor of Law at the Ateneo de Manila Law School and Philippine Christian University.)

Note: Originally Published in Philippine Council for Foreign Relations Journal, Q2 2021 

PHILIPPINES’ SOFT POWER CONTRIBUTION TO RULE OF LAW

The Philippines, like other nations, faces the twin challenges of saving lives and restoring the livelihood of so many of its people.  These challenges must be faced on a nation-wide basis because Covid-19 does not recognize boundaries.  Neither can a nation face these challenges alone.  To overcome the virus requires cooperation among the community of nations because the world has become a global village.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has adopted a Comprehensive Recovery Framework calling for a “whole of community” approach based on the idea that the well-being of the people living in the region is intrinsically linked to ASEAN as an institution.  This approach perceives that ASEAN may not necessarily represent the sentiments of the people.

The Philippines also faces the third challenge of China’s expansionism in the South China Sea to convert this international seaway of trade into a Chinese lake.  This is likewise a challenge to the countries in the region, threatening their national sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the economic well-being of their peoples.  This challenge impacts the rivalry between the United States, as the dominant superpower, and China as the rising power in the region, which is likewise a concern of all the countries in the region. This rivalry has placed the Philippines in a position to negotiate for better terms of trade with China and better terms in defense matters with the United States. 

China’s expansionism shows that the challenge for the world today remains basically the same, to fulfill the aspirations embodied in the Preamble of the UN Charter: peace and security, faith in fundamental human rights, respect for treaty obligations, and the promotion of social progress for better standards of life in larger freedom.  This paper will review how the Rule of Law through the Arbitral Ruling has thwarted China’s ambition to enforce its Nine- Dash-Line through force, and to unilaterally revise the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

China’s Expansionism 

China’s aggressive behavior has dictated the setting of our bilateral relations. The purpose of the arbitration was to defend our fishing rights, protect the fragile ecosystem and its rich biodiversity, safeguard our petroleum and mining rights particularly in the Reed Bank, and recover the Mischief Reef (and eventually Scarborough Shoal), which China occupies illegally.  Of these, the concern about our food supply is the most relevant today due to Covid-19.

China’s aggression began after the Philippine Senate voted in 1991 to terminate the bases agreement with the United States.  With the departure of US forces, China occupied Mischief Reef, a low tide elevation within our exclusive economic zone, which forms part of our Continental Shelf.  Under the Convention, China can never acquire Mischief Reef by occupation or otherwise because Mischief Reef cannot be detached from our Continental Shelf.  (See Paragraph 309, Permanent Court of Arbitration case no. 2013-19)

China’s occupation of Scarborough Shoal by force in April 2012 provoked another crisis in our bilateral relations with China.  Scarborough Shoal is not part of the Spratly’s and is Philippine territory located not far from Luzon, the Philippines’ largest island, and well within our exclusive economic zone. 

Arbitration Under UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

As the Philippines could not bring the issue of the Philippines’ sovereignty over Scarborough Shoal before the International Court of Justice without China’s consent, the Philippines filed for arbitration to protect its maritime zones, particularly the Reed Bank from China’s ambitions.  This Petition did not seek any ruling on the sovereignty over the Spratly islands or Scarborough Shoal.  China, however, claims that the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf are not really exclusive, alleging that China’s historic rights modify the Convention’s provisions.   

China has refused to comply with the decision of the Arbitral Tribunal issued in July 2016. The Nine Dash-Line has increased the instability in the South China Sea because it likewise encroaches on the exclusive economic zone of other ASEAN countries, impedes the right of free transit in the high seas, and violates the Common Heritage of Mankind, thereby affecting the rights of all states, including even landlocked countries.   

The Common Heritage of Mankind in the Convention refers to the Area (the seabed below the high seas) and its resources over which no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights; neither can any State or natural or juridical person appropriate any part thereof.  All rights in resources of the Area are vested in Mankind as a whole.  (Articles 136 and 137 of the Convention)  

China Engaged Philippines in Total Psywar

For a time, China engaged the Philippines in total psywar because the Arbitral Ruling destroyed the bases for its expansionism but Philippine diplomacy eased the tension. China threatened us with war and conducted hybrid warfare, forbidden by the UN Charter, as well as in economic, psychological and media warfare. China’s propaganda spread the untruth that the Arbitral Tribunal is not a UN tribunal, that its decision is not binding because China refused to take part in the proceedings, and that the Philippines failed to comply with the provision of Article 281 of the Convention to exchange views with China prior to filing for arbitration.    

The Arbitral Award was not determined by the Permanent Court of Arbitration, which was appointed by the President of the UN Tribunal of the Law of the Sea to serve as the Registry for the arbitration. (See Paragraph 31)   The President of the UN Tribunal of the Law of the Sea also appointed the president and members of the Arbitral Tribunal, (except for the arbitrator appointed by the Philippines) because China declined to appoint its arbitrator.  The Arbitral Tribunal wasconstituted under Annex VII to the Convention.  (See Para 31)

The Convention provides for compulsory procedures entailing binding decisions with respect to any dispute concerning its interpretation or application.  (See Article 286 of the Convention)  The Arbitral Tribunal noted that China’s non- participation did not constitute a bar to the proceedings because the Convention expressly acknowledges the possibility of non-participation by one of the parties to the dispute and expressly provides in Article 9 of Annex VII of the Convention that such non-participation does not constitute a bar to the proceedings. (See Para 117) 

As for Article 283 of the Convention, the Arbitral Tribunal noted that this requires parties to exchange views on the means of settling their dispute, not the substance of the dispute:  The Philippines expressed a clear preference for multilateral negotiations whereas China insisted that only bilateral talks could be considered.  While the Philippines is not required to negotiate under Article 283, it is well established that a State is not required under international law to continue negotiations when it concludes that the possibility of a negotiated solution has been exhausted.”   (See Para 160)  

Nine Dash-Line Is Without Lawful Effect

A jurisdictional issue in the arbitration was whether China could claim any possible overlap of its entitlements to an exclusive economic zone with that of the Philippines.  China had excluded maritime boundary delimitation from its acceptance of compulsory dispute settlement with its declaration in 2006.  (See Para 6)  

The Arbitral Tribunal ruled that there was no such possibility either on the basis of the Nine Dash-Line or on the basis of the Spratly Islands providing entitlement to an economic zone, either singly or as a unit. (See Para 1199)  

The Arbitral Tribunal noted that the Convention built on the provisions of prior international law and the 1958 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, which established limits for maritime entitlements and set out the rights and obligations of coastal States and other states within such maritime zones.  The Convention thus provided a comprehensive system of maritime zones capable of encompassing any area of sea or seabed. (See Para 231)  Any claim to an exclusive economic zone beyond these limits would, therefore, encroach on other maritime zones, such as the high seas, the Common heritage of Mankind or the exclusive economic zone of another country.

The Arbitral Tribunal noted that China’s claim to have historic rights to the living and non-living resources in the waters of the South China Sea within the Nine Dash-line would be incompatible, at least to the extent of the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf pertaining to the Philippines.  (See Para 232). 

The Arbitral Tribunal held that the Convention is clear in according sovereign rights to the living and non-living resources of the exclusive economic zone to the coastal State alone. (See Para 243)   The provisions of the Convention concerning the continental shelf “are even more explicit that rights to the living and non-living resources pertain to the coastal State exclusively. “ (See Para 244)

On the other hand, the Convention has no provision preserving or protecting any historic rights in the exclusive economic zone/continental shelf that exceeds the limits provided by the Convention, i.e., 200 miles from the baseline.  China’s claim to historic rights is not compatible with the nature of these maritime zones and the rights of other States within those zones.  (See Para 246)

The Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling is supported by the debates of the Third UN Conference, where “China actively positioned itself as one of the foremost defenders of the rights of developing countries and was resolutely opposed to any suggestion that coastal states could be obliged to share the resources of the exclusive economic zone with other powers that had historically fished in those waters.” (See Para 251)

In any event, the Arbitral Tribunal ruled that the exercise of freedoms permitted under international law could not give rise to a historic right.  (See Para 268)    The Tribunal noted that China’s navigation and trade in the South China Sea, for all of history, as well as fishing beyond the territorial sea, represented the exercise of high sea freedoms. (See Para 269)  Before the UN Conventions on the Law of the Sea, all of the South China Sea, except for the territorial seas, formed part of the high seas, which are open to all States, whether coastal or landlocked. 

On the other hand, China could not have acquired any rights after the adoption of the Convention because the extent of the rights asserted within the ‘nine-dash line’ only became clear with China’s Notes Verbales of May 2009.  Since that date, China’s claims have been clearly objected to by other States.  (See Para 275)

No Archipelagic Baselines Allowed in Spratlys

The Arbitral Tribunal likewise held that China cannot claim an overlapping exclusive economic zone/continental shelf with the Philippines on the basis of the Spratly Islands. 

The features in the South China Sea are classified in a system defining them as follows: 1) fully entitled islands (2) rocks entitled only to a territorial sea; 3) low-tide elevations; and 4) submerged features.  (See Para 507)

The difference between an island and a rock is that, while both of them have some features above water at high tide, rocks cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own and are not entitled to an exclusive economic zone/continental shelf. (See Art 121 (3) of the Convention)

A low-tide elevation is a naturally formed area of land, which is surrounded by and above water at low tide, but submerged at high tide (Art 3 of the Convention.).  When they are converted into artificial islands, they do not thereby acquire the status of islands and have no marine entitlements.  (See Article 60 (8) of the Convention)

The Arbitral Tribunal made an exhaustive examination of whether any of the major features in the Spratly Islands, including Itu Aba (the largest island), could meet the requirements of Article 121 (3) to be considered an island.  The test was whether any any of them could fully sustain human habitation or economic life on its own, in its original state, before being converted into an artificial island.  Otherwise such a feature, although above water at high tide, should be treated only as a rock, and not entitled to an exclusive economic zone/continental shelf.

In making this determination, the Arbitral Tribunal also highlighted that there is a link between Article 121 (3) and the purpose of the exclusive economic zone.  (See Para 507)

The principal impetus for establishing this new exclusive economic zone was “to balance the interest of the peoples of coastal developing States with the interests of the traditional maritime States, and those States with long range fishing industries.” (See Para 515)  It was not intended to unfairly and inequitably generate enormous entitlements to maritime space that would serve not to benefit the local population but to award a windfall to the (potentially distant) State having a claim to uninhabited islands. (See Para 516)

The Arbitral Tribunal considered that the human habitation required was “the habitation by a portion of the population for whose benefit the exclusive economic zone was being introduced.”  (See Para 520)  China, evidently, is also a distant land with respect to the Spratly Islands.

The Arbitral Tribunal held that, in light of these considerations, none of the high tide features in the Spratly Islands are capable of sustaining human habitation of their own within the meaning of Article 121 (3) of the Convention.  All of their high tide features are, therefore, legally rocks and do not generate entitlements to an exclusive economic zone or continental shelf.  (See Para 646)  

The Arbitral Tribunal further rejected China’s assertion that the Spratly Islands should be enclosed within a system of archipelagic or straight baselines, surrounding the high tide features of the group, and accorded an entitlement to maritime zones as a single unit.  The Arbitral Tribunal noted that the use of archipelagic baselines is strictly controlled by Article 47 (1) of the Convention and limits their use to Archipelagic States.  China is constituted principally by territory on the mainland and cannot meet the definition of an Archipelagic State. (See Para 573)

The Arbitral Tribunal noted that not even the Philippines can declare archipelagic baselines in the Kalayaan Island Group because the archipelagic baselines should include the main islands and meet the requirements of ratio of water to land of 9:1. (See Para 574)

Duty to Harmonize Laws with the Convention

The Tribunal held that China’s accession to the Convention reflects a commitment to bring incompatible claims into alignment with its provisions. (See Para 262)   Unlike China, the Philippines aligned its laws by passing Republic Act 9522, which abandoned the claim to historic rights to waters within the Treaty of Paris.

The Arbitral Tribunal confirmed that its decision was final and shall be complied with by the parties to the dispute. (See Para 1180)   This obligation is imposed by the basic rule “pacta sunt servanda” expressed in Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. (See Para 1195)   The Convention on the Law of the Sea itself expresses in Article 300 that “State Parties shall fulfill in good faith the obligations assumed under this Convention.”

Code of Conduct

The Code of Conduct has been under negotiation between ASEAN and China for years, in accordance with the agreement in the Declaration of Conduct.  It seeks to produce a legally binding agreement to address the tension in the South China Sea. This Code should be compatible with, and reflect the decision of the Arbitral ruling that the Nine Dash-Line is without lawful effect.   The Code is needed because the issue of sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and the Spratly Islands remains unsettled. If it does not respect the Arbitral Ruling, it will not achieve its purpose.  We will see whether China will sign a Code of Conduct and comply with the Arbitral ruling by aligning its laws with the Convention.

Thucydides Trap

There are two good reasons why China should enter into a Code of Conduct.  The first is that it avoids the Thucydides Trap, the phenomenon that the rivalry between a rising power and a dominant power leads to war.  If military conflict should arise because of the Nine Dash-Line, the world would see China as the aggressor.  The second is that the Nine Dash-Line makes China resemble a rogue State and distracts it from its real interest. 

An article published by the China Institute of International Studies, one of the leading think tanks in China, expressed the opinion that the Thucydides Trap cannot apply to the competition between China and the United States because today’s world is different from Ancient Greece as “there were no international organizations and international law as a kind of mechanism to achieve international peace”  (See its July-August 2016 issue)

The Nine Dash-Line violates one of the most important UN Conventions, damaging China’s credibility as a responsible Power, and puts in question the value of treaties entered into by China. The United States is still suffering from its decision to invade Iraq without the vote of the UN Security Council.

China has more influence than Russia today, although Russia is the second nuclear superpower.  It is China’s economy that makes it the rising power in the world. The Nine Dash-Line impedes trade and economic growth and endangers the peace and stability that China needs for its Belt and Road Initiative. Its image as a regional hegemon promotes distrust with its neighbors in the Indo-Pacific region.

ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

Securing peace through trade and development, especially in the South China Sea, is the goal of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.  This initiative envisages ASEAN as having the central role in shaping the economic and security architecture of the dynamic regions of the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean and their surrounding areas as Southeast Asia is located at its center.  

The Philippines’ location at the center of the South China Sea similarly imposes a special responsibility upon Filipinos as a people, to be active in this initiative, because this is simply an extension of the maritime route of the Belt and Road Initiative to the Pacific and the revival of the Galleon Trade which inked four continents and made Manila the first global city in the world. The Galleon trade between the Philippines and Mexico brought silk from China to Madrid paid for with silver mined in Bolivia.

The ASEAN Outlook is intended to be inclusive in terms of ideas and proposals and does not exclude any country. These ideas should include the protection of the maritime zones under the Convention and the development of their resources for maximum benefit. The underlying principle to promote cooperation will be ASEAN Centrality through ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit as platforms for dialogue and cooperation, while preserving their formats. 

Conclusion

Filipinos will undoubtedly continue to demand for the enforcement of the Arbitral Ruling.  This is now part of International Law as a subsidiary means of determining the law.  (See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice)  The International Court of Justice closely examines its previous decisions and those of the Tribunals of the UN Convention in reaching its decisions.  The Nine Dash-Line undermines the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, negotiated by the international community to serve as the Constitution for a legal order for the seas, and hinders the progressive development of international law to resolve disputes peacefully. 

The Philippines is the 12th most populous nation in the world, with a huge diaspora in the continents of the globe.  We should remember that the Philippines is uniquely present in the UN logo as a dot, as a founding member and signatory of the UN Charter.  That dot, let us remember, played an influential role in pushing for the insertion of the word “self-determination” in the UN Charter.  We have a proud record of supporting the emergence and growth of the Third World, and played the historic role of being the Chair of the Group of 77 during the 50th anniversary of the United Nations. 

Filipinos gave an example of how to fight peacefully for freedom and the democratic way of life with our People Power Revolution in 1986.  Thereafter, the Philippines was the trail -blazer organizing the Organization of Newly Restored Democracies.  The countries of the Second World joined this organization as well as Cuba and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) but the United States was shortsighted and did not support this initiative.  Now, President Joe Biden is calling for a “Summitry of Democracies.” 

The Arbitral ruling is the Philippines’ Soft Power contribution to preserve peace and prevent wars.  The strategic location of our nation at the center of the busiest seaway of the world, which is now an imminent flashpoint, has placed upon us Filipinos a burden of standing up to the Great Powers and reminding them of our shared responsibility of realizing the dreams embodied in the Preamble of the UN Charter

(This article was also published in the PCFR (Philippine Council for Foreign Relations Journal, March 2021)

UNITE TO REPULSE THE HEGEMON

 China continues to violate the Philippines’ 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Continental Shelf, despite the fact that it has its own 200-mile EEZ and Continental Shelf located across the vast South China Sea and in defiance of the Arbitral Ruling.  It would take the South China Sea to shrink hundreds of nautical miles before they overlap.

PH 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone

Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which both the Philippines and China are obliged to respect, the EEZ of a coastal State may extend only up to 200 nautical miles.  (A State may also claim an extended Continental Shelf where that of an adjacent or neighboring State does not impede it.)

President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Presidential Decree 1599 on 11 June 1978, establishing the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone which extends to a distance of 200 hundred nautical miles, provided that where it overlaps with that of an adjacent or neighboring state, the common boundaries shall be determined by agreement.  This Presidential Decree, which has the status of law, is in accord with the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 

The International Court of Justice recognized the status of the Exclusive Economic Zone as part of customary international law in 1984.  (See Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, Canada v. United States of America, (1984) ICJ Rep 246, 94)  

Thus, even before the entry into force of the Convention in 1994, the establishment of the 200-mile EEZ by the Philippines was the common practice of States based on the negotiated and agreed text of this Convention and recognized as part of customary international law.

PH 200-Mile Continental Shelf

President Marcos signed Proclamation NO. 370 on 20 March 1968, declaring the Philippines Continental Shelf.  This was a proclamation, not a law, which was issued in accordance with the provisions of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.  Article 2 (3) of this treaty provided that “The rights of the coastal State do not depend on occupation, effective or notional, or any express proclamation.”  

Thus, the Philippines did not need to issue any Proclamation at all.  In 1969, the International Court of Justice ruled that Articles 1 to 3 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf had become part of customary internal law.  (See North Sea Continental Shelf (1969) ICJ Rep 3) 

In the abovementioned case, the International Court of Justice repeatedly emphasized the concept of natural prolongation and adopted the ipso jure doctrine with respect to the Continental Shelf. The Court declared:

    “The rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of continental shelf that constitutes a natural            prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea exist ipso jure and ab initio by virtue of its           sovereignty over the land, and as an extension of it in an exercise of sovereign rights for the purpose     of exploring the sea bed and exploiting its natural resources. In short, there is here an inherent right.”      (Underscoring mine.)

The UN Convention on the Law of Sea extended the outer limits of the Continental Shelf to a juridical distance of two hundred nautical miles, modifying the exploitability criterion of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf.

In 1985, the International Court of Justice recognized that the provision of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea extending the coastal State’s Continental Shelf to a distance of up to 200 nautical miles had attained the status of customary international law. (See Libya/Malta Continental Shelf case, ICJ Reports, 1985, p. 13; 81 ILR p. 239.)

The Court’s decision took into account that Libya was not a Party to the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf while, on the other hand, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea had not yet entered into force. 

No overlapping of PH Rights to 200-mile EEZ and Continental Shelf Facing China

The Philippines rights to a 200-mile EEZ and Continental Shelf facing China are firmly based on both customary international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and confirmed by the Arbitration Tribunal constituted under Annex VII of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.

Among China’s objections to the jurisdiction of the Arbitration Tribunal was that the case involved delimitation of maritime boundaries.  China, however, failed to establish that it had Exclusive Economic Zone/Continental Shelf overlapping with those of the Philippines. 

China’s Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf are separated from the marine entitlements of the Philippines by a vast ocean.   

The Tribunal ruled that China could not claim that it had EEZ/Continental Shelf overlapping with those of the Philippines on the basis of the “nine-dash-line” which the Tribunal declared to be contrary to the Convention and without lawful effect.

Neither could China claim overlapping on the basis of high-tide features in the Spratly Islands, because none of them are entitled to an EEZ/Continental Shelf.   China also could not draw archipelagic baselines because China is not an archipelagic state.

As there is no overlapping of maritime boundaries, the Philippines’s EEZ/Continental Shelf evidently extends up to 200 nautical miles in the area facing China, without the need for the Arbitration Tribunal to declare this.

It is not relevant to consider here that there may be overlapping of maritime areas of the Philippines with those of neighboring countries.   For this reason, Vietnam acknowledged that the Arbitration Tribunal had jurisdiction over this case filed by the Philippines against China, and no country asked to intervene in the case.

China’s Continuing Violations

Since the International Court of Justice declared in 1984 that the EEZ was part of customary international law, and in 1985, that the 200 mile continental shelf was likewise part of customary international law, no State may occupy rocks or islets located within the EEZ/ Continental Shelf of another State.   

China never occupied any feature in the Spratly Islands until 1988, although it claims sovereignty over them.  China later occupied two low-tide elevations and a rock within the Philippines EEZ and Continental Shelf, after it had signed the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea when this treaty was opened for signature on 10 December 1982.  

As a signatory to this Convention, China was obliged to refrain from committing acts which would defeat the object or purpose of the treaty unless it shall have made clear its intention not to ratify it.  (See Art 18 of the Vienna Convention o n the Law of Treaties, to which China is a Party.)   China ratified the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea on 7 June 1996.

As noted by the Arbitration Tribunal, this Convention was intended to be the constitution of the oceans to comprehensively allocate all the maritime areas of the oceans.

China’s unlawful seizure and construction of an artificial island on Mischief Reef (which is a low-tide elevation that is not capable of appropriation) and its occupation of the high-tide elevation of Scarborough Shoal by force, both of which are within the Philippines EEZ and Continental Shelf, are continuing violations under international law of our sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 

As a retired foreign service officer, I wish to underscore that the Department of Foreign Affairs is the Philippines first line of defense against China’s expansionism and that the DFA is manned by professionals dedicated to the service of our country, as is the case with the Department of National Defense and the Armed Forces of the Philippines.  

The President of the Philippines depends upon the DFA, the DND and the AFP, and other Government agencies like the Philippine Coast Guard and Bureau of Aquatic Resources (BFAR) to defend the Philippines’ sovereignty, sovereign rights and jurisdiction.  I ask Filipinos everywhere to unite and support our government in defending these rights for the sake of our future generations.

“Sincere Commitment or Empty words: “China will never seek hegemony, expansionism or sphere of influence (Xi Jinping)"

The South China Sea is one of the busiest highways for international trade.  It is not only in our mutual interest that we safeguard the shipping that passes through it but in the common interest of countries, both inside and outside the region. 

In January 2017, President Xi Jinping gave an inspired talk at Davos, defending economic globalization and portraying China “as adhering to multilateralism to uphold the authority and efficacy of multilateral institutions.” He went on to say:  “We should honor promises and abide by rules.  One should not select or bend rules as he sees fit.”  His speech at Davos was well received with China being perceived as the new champion of globalization.

However, today, with China flexing its military muscle, the landscape looks different.  China’s aggressive behavior during the past threes years in the waters of Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and the Philippines have increased insecurity in our region and have portrayed China as a regional hegemon.  These developments have caused the Belt and Road Initiative to be viewed with suspicion.

In India, China’s investments in the Indian Ocean are seen as Red flags being hoisted all around India. This appears to give momentum to security cooperation among the QUAD countries: India, Australia, Japan and the United States.

China’s investments in the Indian Ocean and in Africa are now being questioned as debt traps, which force developing countries to forfeit their strategic infrastructure and their natural resources to China.

China needs to change this perception.  The success of the Belt and Road Initiative is of immense importance to China and to our region.  China needs peace and stability in the Indo – Pacific region.

Thus, at his address this year to the United Nations General Assembly, President Xi Jinping vowed that China “will never seek hegemony, expansionism, or sphere of influence.”

Earlier, Deng Xiaoping forewarned in his unforgettable message to the UN General Assembly at its Special Session on 10 April 1974:

“If one day, China should change its color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it. “

The world is watching whether China’s actions will match President Xi’ Jinping’s words.  In the post-pandemic era, the world wishes to be governed by the Rule of Law.

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), in its Preamble, declares that the States Parties are aware of the historic significance of this Convention, as an important contribution to the maintenance of peace, justice and progress for all peoples of the world.  

Evidently, China has a lot to gain from the legal order established under UNCLOS, which ensures peace and stability in the South China Sea, and conversely, China has a lot to lose, if tension and conflict continue to prevail because of the non-observance of this legal order.

The Philippines and China have historic and cultural ties; we are not only neighbors but also kinfolk.  Let us move two steps forward by restoring the status quo ante when Mischief Reef was not occupied by China and continue with this positive approach by complying with our duty to cooperate under UNCLOS, particularly with the protection of the marine environment and the promotion of sustainable fisheries. 

PH is not an ant in a battle between two elephants: Vigorous multilateral diplomacy is needed to defend what is ours.

 The Philippines is not an ant between two elephants in our struggle to enforce the Arbitral Ruling promulgated pursuant to the provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The UNCLOS is the constitution of the oceans, agreed upon by the international community.

 

Battle is Ours Over Our Maritime Rights

 

The Philippines is not a pawn involved in the power struggle between the United States, as the dominant superpower in the world, and China as the rising star.  The Arbitral Ruling is all about our maritime rights under UNCLOS, as both the Philippines and China are Parties to this multilateral agreement. 

 

This is all about our struggle to protect our fishing rights in our 200-miles Exclusive Economic Zone and its fragile ecosystem and rich biodiversity; to prevent China’s occupation of the Reed Bank ((Recto), which forms part of our Continental Shelf, and to exercise therein our petroleum  and mining rights; and to recover Mischief Reef, also part of our Continental Shelf, which China occupies illegally.

 

The issue of who has sovereignty over the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal was not brought before the Arbitral Tribunal as it is the International Court of Justice which has jurisdiction over issues relating to land.  

 

Maritime rights, on the other hand, deal with issues relating to internal waters, bays, straits, archipelagic waters, territorial seas and the contiguous zones, exclusive economic zones, continental shelves, the high seas and the deep seabed.

 

The Philippines has been prudent not to take sides in the power struggle between China and the United States.  However, China should note that Filipinos are mindful that it is the United States that seeks to protect the status quo on the law of the sea under UNCLOS, which recognizes the exclusive sovereign rights and jurisdiction of coastal states over their Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf. 

 

China, on the other hand, seeks to subvert UNCLOS and replace it with its nine-dash-line in order to convert the vast expanse of the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, never mind that the line encroaches on two-thirds of the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zone and those of other ASEAN member states. 

 

Shift to Vigorous Multilateral Diplomacy

 

In defending its permanent paramount interests, the Philippines has apparently moved from quiet bilateral diplomacy to a more active multilateral diplomacy.  Over a period of four years, the Philippines has patiently sought to accommodate China and give it a way to save face.

 

In my column published on 30 May 2020, I noted that the Philippines can no longer afford to continue with its quiet diplomacy with China because this policy places no pressure on China and encourages China to intimidate its neighbors.  In the meantime, much time has been lost to replace the Malampaya oil fields which will soon be depleted. 

 

On 26 June 2020, the 36^th ASEAN Summit, which was hosted by Vietnam by virtual mode, declared that UNCLOS is the law that determines maritime entitlements to the EEZ and Continental Shelf, omitting any reference to general international law:

 

“We reaffirmed that the 1982 UNCLOS is the basis for determining maritime entitlements, sovereign rights, jurisdiction and legitimate interests over maritime zones.”   “UNCLOS sets out the legal framework within which all activities in the oceans and seas must be carried out.”   

 

China claims that the UNCLOS Exclusive Economic Zone is not really exclusive but is modified by general international law based on historic rights.  However, the fictitious nine-dash-line has no historic basis because prior to UNCLOS, the international community recognized the territorial sea and contiguous zone, but beyond there was only the high seas, which was mare liberum.

 

Resort to UN General Assembly

 

The Philippines again may have no choice but to bring the Arbitral Ruling to the UN General Assembly in the same way that the Philippines needed to resort to arbitration under the UNCLOS provisions on “Compulsory Procedures Entailing Binding Decisions.”  

 

Moral pressure and loss of prestige and credibility is the ultimate sanction on a rogue state when Chapter VII sanctions by the UN Security Council cannot be adopted because of the veto by a Permanent Member.  No state can afford to be a pariah in the international community.

 

For this battle, the Philippines needs to make adequate preparations on a timetable based on pragmatic considerations.  The first opportunity to explain the Arbitral Ruling to the world and to the Chinese people is when our head of state or his representative is scheduled in these coming months to address the UN General Assembly.

 

Having remained quiet about the Arbitral Ruling, the Philippines should now avail of every opportunity to explain the Arbitral ruling at relevant international and regional forums.  ASEAN provides many venues for this, with the “Outlook on the Indo-Pacific” providing an overarching theme.

 

Activate The “ASEAN Outlook on Indo-Pacific”

 

Thus, the Philippines’ engagement should actively push for the activation of the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.”  Southeast Asia lies at the center of these two dynamic regions, as pointed out in the Rationale for this initiative.

 

Prominent among the areas of cooperation for this initiative is maritime cooperation. Among others, this includes:  firstly, to prevent unsustainable exploitation of marine resources through overfishing and the destruction of ecosystems and biodiversity; secondly, to promote sustainable management of marine resources and support small- scale fishing activities; and thirdly to promote connectivity through maritime commerce and the development of the blue economy.  

 

This ties up well with our most important and urgent objective in bringing China to arbitration: food security.  It is not petroleum but fish which is the most valuable resource of our Exclusive Economic Zone. 

 

China has the biggest fishing fleets in the world and subsidizes them, ignoring its obligations to cooperate in the management and conservation of the living resources of the sea and the protection of the marine environment. 

 

Post-Covid-19 World Order

 

It is in the interest of ASEAN to lead the shaping of the economic and security architecture of the Indo-Pacific. The underlying principle for promoting cooperation is ASEAN centrality to achieve peace, security, stability and prosperity in the wider Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions.

 

As explained in the white paper on the “ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific”, the way to promote it includes strategic discussions in ASEAN-led mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit, the ASEAN Plus One, the ASEAN Regional Forum and the ASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting-Plus.  

 

The Outlook also recognizes the potential for cooperation with other regional mechanisms.  Maritime Cooperation, Connectivity and Food Security are relevant issues for APEC, whose mission is to promote and accelerate regional economic integration and to enhance human security.

 

These discussions will provide a preview of what the Post Covid-19 World Order may look like:  how much of the status quo will be preserved and how much will change.  We must seize the opportunity in these strategic talks to contribute ideas and show leadership to advance the common interest of humanity and our national interest.

 

Conclusion

 

The challenge ahead is not for an ant. But we are a populous country, the thirteenth in the world and the second in ASEAN, with a huge diaspora in the continents of the globe.  

 

We have a proud history in diplomacy, being a founding member and a signatory of the United Nations Charter, a founding member of ASEAN, and the first democracy in Asia.  In these roles, we actively supported the emergence of the Third World.

 

The Philippines is present in the UN logo as a dot and that dot reacted in a big way, pushing for the insertion of the word “self-determination” in the UN Charter.  

 

In the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, the Philippines successfully introduced the concept of the Archipelagic State in the Convention.

 

As the UN Charter is the expression of the peoples of the world, we should prepare to have a corresponding big voice in the discussions in the United Nations system of what the Post Covid-19 World Order will be. 

 

OF LAW AND POLITICS

Ambassador Jaime S. Bautista

Four of Four Parts on the Notice to Terminate the VFA: PH should keep its friends and raise its voice in ASEAN to defend its permanent interests.

On the eve of the 45^th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and China, I reminisce about my tour of duty in Peking from 1976 to 1979 and my experience in the 1980s, and reflect on the many changes that have occurred in the relations of the Philippines with China and other States.

No Permanent Friends, No Permanent Enemies

The relations between states are dynamic, sometimes determined by the personality and ambitions of their leaders.  Thus, Lord Palmerston, the noted British Prime Minister, and other statesmen have observed that as between states, there are no permanent friends or permanent enemies, only permanent interests.  This is true of both the Philippines and China.  The Philippines, however, should keep its friends, especially at a time when its sovereignty and territorial integrity are under threat.

The Philippines has the Mutual Defense Treaty, the Visiting Forces Agreement, and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States but the United States was once the enemy.  The Commonwealth of the Philippines fought against Japan during the Second World War because the Philippines was on the brink of becoming independent.  The Philippines now has strategic relations with Japan for economic and security reasons.

China fought the United States and the Philippines in the Korean War because the United States and allied troops, bearing the flag of the United Nations, crossed the 38^th Parallel after driving back the North Korean invaders.  This was the era of the Cold War when China and the Soviet Union were on the same side.

The Sino-Soviet split on ideology after the demise of Josef Stalin and his succession by Nikita Kruschev marked the Soviet Union as China’s main antagonist.  This allowed the surprise Nixon visit to Peking in 1972, and initially the exchange of Liaison Offices.  The normalization of relations between China and the United States followed on 1 January 1979.  

1976 as Year of Great Changes in China

I was cross-posted from Kuala Lumpur to Peking in 1976, when great changes took place in China. It was the year of the demise of the triumvirate; Zhou Enlai (Head of Government ) in January, Zhu  Deh (Head of State) in May, and Mao Zedong (Head of Party) in September.  Earlier in April, the Gang of Four headed by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, had succeeded in deposing Deng Xiaoping a second time.      

The great earthquake in Tangshan took place in July, an omen of the fall of a dynasty according to Chinese belief.  With Mao’s demise two months later, the Gang of Four lost in the “Struggle Session” which ensued, leading to the ascendancy of Deng Xiaoping, the author of China’s modernization.

The big question was whether Premier Hua Guafeng could retain power as Mao’s chosen successor.  I reported that Deng would return because he was with the Long March and his Comrades were around.  His economic views were pragmatic reflected in his comment: “It does not matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice.”  Hua’s experience was limited to the rural economy.  He lasted for several years but eventually lost influence to Deng whom I predicted in a report I authored would rise to become China’s paramount leader.

Great Leaders

Vice Chairman Deng Xiaoping and King Norodom Sihanouk were among the great leaders I had the pleasure of meeting in Peking. 

I had the privilege of meeting Deng for the first time, when as Charge ad interim, I helped send off Vice Premier Li Xiannian, for his official visit to Manila.  Deng was there to impress upon the importance of the visit. He was very nice, posing for a picture with me and my spouse and the Embassy staff.

Li’s visit to the Philippines was a success.  My wife and I had the honor of meeting him and his spouse at the Great Hall of the People on multiple occasions at either the dinners (as Charge a.i.) or the return dinners (as Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes’s substitute) for the State Visits.  Li and his wife would break out into big smiles upon seeing me and my wife in our barong and Filipina dress during the Protocol to introduce the guests.  Li became president of China from June 1983 to April 1988.

China was very active promoting itself as the leader of the developing countries and the socialist camp. Selected leaders from the Third World and the Second World who were not considered as being subservient to the Soviet Union were invited and lavishly feted.  

Among the Heads of State I shook hands with were leaders subsequently deposed like Khmer Rouge’s Pol Pot and Central African Emperor Jean Bedal Bokassa, as well as those who suffered a worse fate, such as being executed or assassinated like Romania’s Nicolae Ceaucescu, Equatorial Guinea’s Francisco Macias Ngume and North Yemen’s Ibrahim al-Hamdi  and his South Yemen counterpart.

 I was privileged to meet Deng again when he received the tourism delegation headed by GSIS and Manila Hotel President Roman Cruz, Jr.  I recall Cruz warning Deng of tourism pollution.  The Philippines helped train the Chinese hotel industry.  When Deng made a speech proposing air bridges between Peking and Taipei which I reported to the DFA, Philippine Airlines became the first airline allowed by China to fly to both Peking and Taipei.

As for the survivor and astute statesman that Sihanouk showed himself to be, I met him when he invited Ambassador Reyes and the entire Philippine Embassy staff  (all were accredited with diplomatic rank) to celebrate at his palace on the occasion of Cambodia’s New Year.  Because of this invitation, I postponed my departure for my cross-posting to the Court of St. James.  Sihanouk was in exile in Peking as China’s guest when Vietnam installed the Heng Samrin regime.

China-Vietnam War

 Before Cambodia’s New Year celebration took place, the Sino-Vietnamese war broke out. Deng had just visited the United States. I seemed to be lucky to be the Charge’ at such times of crisis.  China had been hinting that Vietnam would be taught a lesson for invading Democratic Kampuchea, China’s ally.  Vietnam was seen as the Soviet Union’s Cuba proxy in Asia.

I recall that elsewhere in the world, the Soviet Union seemed to be tilting the balance of global power in its favor, with Cuba’s intervention in Angola.  The Soviet Union also had success at the Horn of Africa when Ethiopia joined the Soviet Camp and thwarted Somalia’s invasion of the Ogaden region.  Vietnam’s invasion which installed the Heng Samrin regime was, therefore, more intolerable.

My luck seemed to hold, because I recall that, while taking a stroll after dinner near our residential building, I encountered the spouse of a fellow diplomat.  She looked at me in surprise, saying: “Jimmy, why are you not at your Embassy?”  Her husband was at their Liaison Office, reporting that the invasion had begun.  I rushed to our Embassy.

I recall that the invasion took place on the eve of the luncheon invitation hosted by the Malaysian Ambassador in honor of Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping who had returned from a successful visit of Malaysia and Singapore.   Foreign Minister Huang Hua was the official designated to represent Deng.

In preparation for this event, the Malaysian deputy chief of mission, Mr. Nik Mohamed, had met with me and our Thai counterpart to discuss current issues. At that time, only Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines had Embassies in Peking.  Mohamed requested me to avoid touching on the sensitive issue of Vietnam.

Voice Radio

During the luncheon celebration, I could not avoid mentioning this important issue.  It was  not every day that I was at a small table with my wife, dining with the Chinese Foreign Minister.  When I broached the subject, I saw the Malaysian and Thai Ambassadors lean noticeably forward to listen.  Huang Hua switched from English to Mandarin.

I used the occasion of the conflict to renew our Embassy’s request for permission to have voice radio.  At that time, only countries considered as China’s special friends were permitted the use of voice radio.  The rest were allowed to send and receive messages by radio only through Morse code.  I succeeded in getting the voice radio, where others could not.

Cambodian New Year

I enjoyed the Cambodian New Year’s celebration.  Sihanouk was the artist and charismatic figure that he strived to be.  He was seated alone, at a table separated from the guests, as if on a throne.  His wife, the lovely Princess Monique, was across the room with other prominent guests.

Sihanouk gave the Philippines special attention. Ambassador Narciso G. Reyes had presented to him a tape of Filipino songs, including “Dahil sa Iyo” sang by First Lady Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos.  Sihanouk highlighted her rendition and played the entire tape during the interval. The party ended with a Filipino song.  Sihanouk also seemed to have anticipated  the importance of a future event.

ICRC Convention in Manila

In 1981, The Philippines was scheduled to  host the Convention of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in Manila through the efforts of the First Lady.  This was the time when ASEAN and China opposed the Heng Samrin’s regime bid to be seated at the UN.  The regime sought to be present at this ICRC Convention. The ICRC rules specified that the Red Cross actually in place in the country should be the one entitled to participate in the Conference. 

Because the ICRC threatened to move the Conference to another venue, the DFA instructed the Philippine Mission in Geneva to discuss the matter with the ICRC.  However, the task fell upon me as Charge ad interim in London because the ICRC President, a British subject, was in England

The ASEAN London Committee declined my request to be present at the meeting.  The ICRC President expressed great displeasure that the Heng Samrin Red Cross could not get visas, arguing vigorously he had received assurances from the First Lady but I told him this was an ASEAN position. The Conference in Manila took place as scheduled without any Red Cross delegation from Cambodia.

Multilateral Cooperation as Developing Countries

The China I knew was a developing country working in harmony with countries of the Third World.  China was active in the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea as was the Philippines. The Conference readily accepted the principle of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) but some fishing Powers sought to share in the sovereign rights of the EEZ States. China opposed this attempt to dilute the exclusiveness of the EEZ.

Even before the entry into effect of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, the International Court of Justice recognized that State practice had accepted the principles of the EEZ and Continental Shelf .

The EEZ is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea that may extend up to 200 miles, reserved for the economic benefit of the population of the adjacent state.

The Continental Shelf is the natural prolongation of the land territory of a coastal state that lies beyond the territorial sea and beneath the EEZ up to 200 miles or beyond, under certain conditions. These are maritime zones adjacent to a State, as opposed to land, which must have features permanently above the sea.

All the countries bordering the South China Sea base their sovereign rights to exploit the resources of their adjoining maritime zones on the principles of the EEZ and Continental Shelf.   But China now claims to have rights across the vast expanse of the South China Sea based on a 9-Dash-Line, contradicting its stand at the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.

China as Regional Hegemon

Today, China is an economic superpower and the hegemon in our region.   Because of its military superiority, China has been aggressive in encroaching on the maritime zones of ASEAN countries across the South China Sea.

When the Philippines filed its Complaint against China, to declare the Nine-Dash-Line as having no legal effect, China abused the Philippines and refused to comply with the Compulsory Procedures for Settlement of Disputes under the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea.  The Philippines was simply enforcing its sovereign right for peaceful settlement of the dispute.

What is it that makes an economic power become a bully and a new colonial imperialist, and act as though it has the right to be a tyrant?  This phenomenon was observed by no less than Deng Xiaoping when he said:

“If one day, China should change its color and turn into a superpower, if she too should play the tyrant in the world, and everywhere subject others to her bullying, aggression, and exploitation, the people of the world should identify her as social-imperialism, expose it, oppose it, and work together with the Chinese people to overthrow it. “

So, Deng was telling the Chinese people: Don’t take other people for granted.  And telling other people: Don’t sell yourselves short.

Permanent Interests

Contrary to fake news being propagated, the Arbitral Award was not issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration which simply acted as the Registrar (Secretariat).

The Arbitral Tribunal was a UN tribunal constituted pursuant to Annex VII of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The President of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea appointed four of the members of the Arbitral Tribunal, including its President, due to China’s refusal to take part in the proceedings.

China’s refusal to recognize the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal had no effect on its standing.   Article 9 of the Annex of the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea provides that “Absence of a party or failure of a party to defend its case shall not constitute a bar to the proceedings” while Article 11 provides that “the award shall be final and without appeal.”

The Philippines’ permanent interests should dictate its foreign policy.  Such is the the Arbitral Award against China which protects the Philippines sovereign rights to its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone and its Continental Shelf in the West Philippine Sea. 

Almost four years have passed since the Arbitral Award was published.  The Philippines chose to engage China in quiet diplomacy to allow a cooling off period because of China’s unjustified angry reaction.

During his fifth visit to China, President told President Xi Jinping that, in accordance with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, “the arbitral award was final, binding and without appeal.”

Need for New Diplomacy

Much time has been lost for replacing the Malampaya oil fields, which will be depleted soon. The Philippines’ food security is also at risk, ominously at this time of the Covid 19 pandemic, with Filipino fishermen being harassed to prevent them from fishing in their traditional fishing grounds. 

The Philippines can no longer afford to continue with quiet diplomacy, which places no pressure on China and encourages China to intimidate its neighbors. 

The recent behavior of China’s Navy in its encounters with the Philippine Navy and the Malaysian Navy during this Covid-19 crisis does not inspire much hope that China will choose a face saving way   to abandon the fiction of the nine-dash-line. 

On 17 February 2020, the Chinese corvette with bow No. 514 trained its radar guns on BRP Conrado Yap  (PS 39) when the latter was on sovereign patrol mission within Philippine waters. The Philippines refused to be intimidated and filed a Protest.

The Philippines should now signal its determination to enforce the Arbitral Award by putting it on record in the ASEAN forums.  The negotiations on a Code of Conduct between ASEAN and China should uphold the Arbitral Award.

China has institutional links with ASEAN as a Dialogue Partner, a member of ASEAN Plus 3, a member of the ASEAN East Asia Summit and a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum.  China is also a member of APEC in which the ten ASEAN member countries have a central role. The Philippines needs to resonate its voice in these forums, including through more recent communication technologies in this new era of lockdowns, and to tell the true story to the Chinese people and the whole world.

Thucydides Trap

The world has turned full circle since the Sino-Soviet split.  In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is now ten.

The Cold War has ended, the Soviet Union has disappeared and a strong Russia has emerged.  China and Russia are friends, having resolved their territorial differences. China is now challenging the United States’ dominant position in the global order, having long prepared for leadership. 

The Philippines seems unable to see on time the reefs that can sink the nation, although like China, its people have shown the will to defend their homeland.

In the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea, even though China is the security threat, the Philippines has common stand with China on the protection of their maritime zones. Both maintain that foreign warships need to give notice and request permission to enter their territorial sea.  This is opposed to the view of the Maritime Powers.

  

On the issue of military exercises in the EEZ, the Convention contains a provision in Article 301 providing for “the peaceful uses of the seas” and the obligation of States Parties “to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.”  

Applying this article to the EEZ, some countries like Bangladesh, Brazil, Cape Verde, India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Uruguay, take the position that, in the EEZ, foreign military exercises and maneuvers, including the right to use weapons, are only permissible with the consent of the coastal state.  China has not made a declaration supporting this view.  I think that it is in the long- term interest of the Philippines to support this view.

Cambodia is not a Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea but it is in Cambodia’s interest to be in solidarity with ASEAN on fundamental issues of regional concern, such as on the peaceful resolution of conflicts in the South China Sea.

Will China’s present leaders listen to Deng Xiaoping’s exhortation and give utmost attention to ASEAN’s concerns about the militarization of the South China Sea to avoid the Thucydides Trap? Already, China has warned of the risk of a new Cold War with the issue of the origin of the new Corona virus.

The Philippines should move for the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo Pacific to be well defined and to be put into practice so that it can achieve a Sea of Peace, Stability and Progress.  China should value its friendship with the Philippines and support this effort.